The sudden fall of Gambetta (26th January 1882) having removed the fear of immediate European complications, the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna again displayed diffidence towards Italy. So great was Bismarck's distrust of Italian parliamentary instability, his doubts of Italian capacity for offensive warfare and his fear of the Francophil tendencies of Depretis, that for many weeks the Italian ambassador at Berlin was unable to obtain audience of the chancellor. But for the Tunisian question Italy might again have been drawn into the wake of France. Mancini tried to impede the organization of French rule in the Regency by refusing to recognize the treaty of Bardo, yet so careless was Bismarck of Italian susceptibilities that he instructed the German consul at Tunis to recognize French decrees. Partly under the influence of these circumstances, and partly in response to persuasion by Baron Blanc, secretary-general for foreign affairs, Mancini instructed Count di Robilant to open negotiations for an Italo-Austrian alliance--instructions which Robilant neglected until questioned by Count Kalnóky on the subject. The first exchange of ideas between the two Governments proved fruitless, since Kalnóky, somewhat Clerical-minded, was averse from guaranteeing the integrity of all Italian territory, and Mancini was equally unwilling to guarantee to Austria permanent possession of Trent and Trieste. Mancini, moreover, wished the treaty of alliance to provide for reciprocal protection of the chief interests of the contracting Powers, Italy undertaking to second Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and Austria and Germany pledging themselves to support Italy in Mediterranean questions. Without some such proviso Italy would, in Mancini's opinion, be exposed single-handed to French resentment. At the request of Kalnóky, Mancini defined his proposal in a memorandum, but the illness of himself and Depretis, combined with an untoward discussion in the Italian press on the failure of the Austrian emperor to return in Rome King Humbert's visit to Vienna, caused negotiations to drag. The pope, it transpired, had refused to receive the emperor if he came to Rome on a visit to the Quirinal, and Francis Joseph, though anxious to return King Humbert's visit, was unable to offend the feelings of his Catholic subjects. Meanwhile (11th May 1882) the Italian parliament adopted the new Army Bill, involving a special credit of £5,100,000 for the creation of two new army corps, by which the war footing of the regular army was raised to nearly 850,000 men and the ordinary military estimates to £8,000,000 per annum. Garibaldi, who, since the French occupation of Tunis, had ardently worked for the increase of the army, had thus the satisfaction of seeing his desire realized before his death at Caprera, on the 2nd of June 1882. "In spirit a child, in character a man of classic mould," Garibaldi had remained the nation's idol, an almost legendary hero whose place none could aspire to fill. Gratitude for his achievements and sorrow for his death found expression in universal mourning wherein king and peasant equally joined. Before his death, and almost contemporaneously with the passing of the Army Bill, negotiations for the alliance were renewed. Encouraged from Berlin, Kalnóky agreed to the reciprocal territorial guarantee, but declined reciprocity in support of special interests. Mancini had therefore to be content with a declaration that the allies would act in mutually friendly intelligence. Depretis made some opposition, but finally acquiesced, and the treaty of triple alliance was signed on the 20th of May 1882, five days after the promulgation of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty in Paris. Though partial revelations have been made, the exact tenor of the treaty of triple alliance has never been divulged. It is known to have been concluded for a period of five years, to have pledged the contracting parties to join in resisting attack upon the territory of any one of them, and to have specified the military disposition to be adopted by each in case attack should come either from France, or from Russia, or from both simultaneously. The Italian General Staff is said to have undertaken, in the event of war against France, to operate with two armies on the north-western frontier against the French armée des Alpes, of which the war strength is about 250,000 men. A third Italian army would, if expedient, pass into Germany, to operate against either France or Russia. Austria undertook to guard the Adriatic on land and sea, and to help Germany by checkmating Russia on land. Germany would be sufficiently employed in carrying on war against two fronts.