_Approximate Rectification, &c._ A last important class of applications of the calculus of finite differences, which deserves to be distinguished from the preceding, consists in the eminently useful employment made of it in geometry for determining by approximation the length and the area of any curve, and in the same way the cubature of a body of any form whatever. This procedure (which may besides be conceived abstractly as depending on the same analytical investigation as the question of interpolation) frequently offers a valuable supplement to the entirely logical geometrical methods which often lead to integrations, which we do not yet know how to effect, or to calculations of very complicated execution.

Such are the various principal considerations to be noticed with respect to the calculus of finite differences. This examination completes the proposed philosophical outline of ABSTRACT MATHEMATICS.

The philosophy of mathematics — Part 98

CONCRETE MATHEMATICS will now be the subject of a similar labour. In it we shall particularly devote ourselves to examining how it has been possible (supposing the general science of the calculus to be perfect), by invariable procedures, to reduce to pure questions of analysis all the problems which can be presented by _Geometry_ and _Mechanics_, and thus to impress on these two fundamental bases of natural philosophy a degree of precision and especially of unity; in a word, a character of high perfection, which could be communicated to them by such a course alone.

The philosophy of mathematics — Part 98

_Its true Nature._ After the general exposition of the philosophical character of concrete mathematics, compared with that of abstract mathematics, given in the introductory chapter, it need not here be shown in a special manner that geometry must be considered as a true natural science, only much more simple, and therefore much more perfect, than any other. This necessary perfection of geometry, obtained essentially by the application of mathematical analysis, which it so eminently admits, is apt to produce erroneous views of the real nature of this fundamental science, which most minds at present conceive to be a purely logical science quite independent of observation. It is nevertheless evident, to any one who examines with attention the character of geometrical reasonings, even in the present state of abstract geometry, that, although the facts which are considered in it are much more closely united than those relating to any other science, still there always exists, with respect to every body studied by geometers, a certain number of primitive phenomena, which, since they are not established by any reasoning, must be founded on observation alone, and which form the necessary basis of all the deductions.

The philosophy of mathematics — Part 98