[Sidenote: General Townshend's attempt to take Bagdad.]
General Townshend advanced on Bagdad with less than a division of mixed Anglo-Indian troops--some 16,000 to 20,000 strong. At Ctesiphon he found a Turkish army of four divisions, with two others in reserve, awaiting him. After a two days' indecisive battle, Townshend, recognizing he had insufficient forces, retired on his forward base at Kut-el-Amara. The Arabs in the neighborhood awaited the issue of the battle, ready to take sides, for the time being, with the winner.
[Sidenote: The Turks much stronger in numbers.]
[Sidenote: Secret of European success in Asia.]
It says much for the stamina of this composite division that, although opposed throughout by five or six times their number of Turks and Turkish irregulars, the latter were unable to overwhelm them. To the Western mind, unacquainted with the mentality and moral weakness of the Moslem under certain circumstances, this may appear a most foolhardy adventure. To the Anglo-Indian the most obvious thing to do when in a tight corner is to go for the enemy no matter what their numbers. All Europeans in India develop an extraordinary pride in race, and an inherent contempt for numbers. It is the secret of their success there. Most Moslems fight well when posted behind strong natural defenses. In open country, such as Mesopotamia, they do not show to so much advantage. Another trait is that when their line of retreat is threatened they are more timorous than European troops. This weakness will have important bearings on the future of the campaign on the Tigris Valley, because the communications of the Turks are threatened by the Russians far in their rear and in more than one place.
[Sidenote: Kut-el-Amara of great strategical importance.]
Townshend's camp at Kut-el-Amara is well supplied with stores and munitions, and will soon be relieved. When his retreat was cut off at the bend of the Tigris River he could still have retired safely by following the Shat-el-Hai to Nasiriyeh. There was no thought, however, of retreat, Kut-el-Amara is geographically of great strategical importance, and the British garrison there has served the useful purpose of detaining large forces of the enemy where it was desired they should remain while important Allied developments were taking place in their flank and rear. Most of these Turkish reinforcements were withdrawn from Armenia when the depth of winter appeared to make it impossible for the Russians to break through the lofty hills of Caucasia.