Not often since the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, is this Court asked to create a new substantive legal liability without legislative aid and as at the common law. This case of first impression here seeks such a result. It arises from the following circumstances.
Early one morning in February, 1944, John Etzel, a soldier, was hit and injured by a truck of the Standard Oil Company of California at a street intersection in Los Angeles. The vehicle was driven by Boone, an employee of the company. At the Government's expense of $123.45 Etzel was hospitalized, and his soldier's pay of $69.31 was continued during his disability. Upon the payment of $300 Etzel released the company and Boone 'from any and all claims which I now have or may hereafter have on account of or arising out of' the accident.
From these facts the novel question springs whether the Government is entitled to recover from the respondents as tort-feasors the amounts expended for hospitalization and soldier's pay, as for loss of Etzel's services. A jury being waived, the District Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Government's favor upon all the issues, including those of negligence and contributory negligence. Judgment was rendered accordingly. D.C., 60 F.Supp. 807. This the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 9 Cir., 153 F.2d 958, and we granted certiorari because of the novelty and importance of the principal question. 329 U.S. 696, 67 S.Ct. 670.
As the case reaches us, a number of issues contested in the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals have been eliminated. Remaining is the basic question of respondents' liability for interference with the government-soldier relation and consequent loss to the United States, together with questions whether this issue is to be determined by federal or state law and concerning the effect of the release. In the view we take of the case it is not necessary to consider the questions relating to the release, for we have reached the conclusion that respondents are not liable for the injuries inflicted upon the Government.
We agree with the Government's view that the creation or negation of such a liability is not a matter to be determined by state law. The case in this aspect is governed by the rule of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838, and National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383, rather than that of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra. In the Clearfield case, involving liabilities arising out of a forged indorsement of a check issued by the United States, the Court said: 'The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pensylvania or of any other state. Cf. Board of Commissioners (of Jackson County) v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 61 S.Ct. 995, 85 L.Ed. 1361. The duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources. Cf. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 60 S.Ct. 480, 84 L.Ed. 694; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956. In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.' 318 U.S. at pages 366, 367, 63 S.Ct. at page 575, 87 L.Ed. 838.
Although the Clearfield case applied these principles to a situation involving contractual relations of the Government, they are equally applicable in the facts of this case where the relations affected are non-contractual or tortious in character.