Experience has shown that the efforts to obtain a large army have for many years proved utterly fruitless. The only effect of those efforts, has been to enhance the price of such men as were obtained, and thereby to disable the States, who exerted themselves to raise recruits, from pouring supplies into the public Treasury. Thus we have not only been unable to get more men, but also to pay and support those which we had gotten. Admitting, however, that the required number were obtained and properly supported as an army, these things are clear; first, that without naval aid we could not make an impression on the enemy's posts. Secondly, that they would be able to harass and distress us in every quarter, by predatory incursions. Thirdly, that they would prevent us from receiving those supplies, which are necessary alike to the operations and existence of an army. And, fourthly, that their inroads on our commerce would produce such distress to the country, as to make our revenues utterly unproductive, and finally bring our affairs to destruction.
An army, therefore, without a navy would be burdensome, without being able to give essential aid, supposing the enemy to have changed their system of carrying on the war. But if we had a navy, we should be able, first, to prevent the enemy from making predatory incursions. Secondly, we should, at least, keep the ships they have on our coast together, which would prevent them from injuring our commerce, or obstructing our supplies. Thirdly, if they kept in this country an equal or superior force, we should by that means have made a powerful diversion in favor of our allies, and contributed to give them a naval superiority elsewhere. Fourthly, if our enemy did not keep an equal or superior force in this country, we should be able by cruising to protect our commerce, annoy theirs, and cut off the supplies directed to their posts, so as to distress their finances and relieve our own. Fifthly, by economising our funds, and constructing six ships annually, we should advance so rapidly to maritime importance, that our enemy would be convinced, not only of the impossibility of subduing us, but also of the certainty that his forces in this country must eventually be lost, without being able to produce any possible advantage. And, sixthly, we should, in this mode, recover the full possession of our country, without the expense of blood or treasure, which must attend any other mode of operations; and while we are pursuing those steps, which lead to the possession of our natural strength and defence.