Attempts to found morality on the laws of human nature—Kant’s theory of moral obligation—Some criticisms of the Kantian theory—Moral conduct must be guided by reason
Even in antiquity, there were efforts to find a basis for morality other than the precepts of religion based on revelation, but the failure of such attempts has long been admitted. In the first chapter of _The Nature of Man_, I described such efforts to find a basis for morality in human nature itself. The Epicureans and the Stoics, although their doctrines were opposed, each claimed to set out from human nature. The principle is too vague for practical use, as human nature can be interpreted in very different fashions.
When several attempts to find a rational basis for morality had failed, Kant’s theory appeared and was hailed by many as a real advance. None the less, it has not met with general approval and may be taken as a supreme instance of the failure to solve the great problem of morality by reason. I do not wish to deal with it at length, but a review of its main outlines is pertinent to my argument.
According to Kant, morality cannot be founded on the feeling of sympathy, nor can it have as its object the happiness of men. Nature would have been an unskilful workman were her object the happiness of human beings, for many lower animals have much more happiness. An inner law is the force compelling us to morality, and without that we should have to seek our guide in happiness.
Kant’s doctrine is an intuitive theory of morality. It is based neither on sympathy nor on any inherent charity, which would make us covet happiness for our fellows, but solely on the consciousness of duty. Kant thought that the action of a man who wished to do good to his fellows was devoid of merit. Conduct was moral only in so far as it was obedience to the inner sense of duty. Schiller’s epigram has thrown into relief this part of the great philosopher’s theory, “When I take pleasure in doing good to my neighbour, I am uneasy, as I fear that I have been lacking in virtue.”
In his criticism of Kant’s system, Herbert Spencer drew a picture of a world inhabited by men who had no sympathy for their fellows and who did good to them against their natural instincts and only from a pure sense of duty. Spencer thought that such a world would be uninhabitable. Clearly, moral conduct, on the Kantian basis, could be followed only by exceptional persons, for most men follow their inclinations rather than any sense of duty. People of lower culture would accept kindnesses from others without caring whether the motive were kindness or a sense of duty, but highly civilised people would not endure service from those whom they knew to be acting against their instincts in obedience to a sense of duty. And so men would be driven to hide the real motives of their conduct, lest they should offend the sensibility of those towards whom their moral conduct was directed. Such cases, where the real motive is concealed, show how impossible it is to judge of conduct from the motives which may be supposed to have inspired it. As it is generally impossible to know whether some altruistic conduct has been inspired by kindness or has been performed as a duty, it is better to give up any attempt to appraise the springs of moral conduct.