That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident, bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized enemy was about to launch a surprise attack.

Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for his battalion.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 46

Mindful of my mission--to protect the supply dump until removed--I had to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this end [he commented]. The supply dump was located at the railroad station in the flat ground south of Kojo--a point difficult to defend, since it was on low ground and could be approached by the enemy from any direction. I considered the most likely direction of enemy approach to be from the south along the coastal road or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest. Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to cover these approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be deployed on the hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the area or counterattack if necessary to prevent loss of the supplies at the railroad station. I did not consider this disposition ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive strength, but it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason to expect an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event such a contingency should occur, it was planned that Company B, the outpost, would withdraw to the main battle position.[125]

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 46

[125] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had taken the supply dump with them.

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) — Part 46

Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about two miles south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies. From east to west the company held three isolated points of high ground:

1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on the east slope of Hill 109;

3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company Headquarters, reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one section of light machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of 3.5″ rocket launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west and south of the 1st Platoon;