It is now contended in argument, on the part of the appellant, (1) that the language of the third subdivision of the will, considered by itself, is sufficient to give to her the real estate in fee and the personal estate absolutely; (2) that the bequest in the fourth subdivision of the will to Ann Smith and Eleonora Cummings Robison is contingent on one of them surviving both the testator and the complaint, and, as the event happened, never became vested; (3) that the bequest to the defendants is dependent upon the vesting of the bequest to Ann Smith and Eleonora Cummings Robison, being affected by the same contingency, namely, one of them surviving the testator and the complainant; and (4) that, if the interest of the complainant under the third subdivision of the will must be limited to a life-estate, as the bequest contained in the fourth subdivision have lapsed, or cannot take effect, the testator died intestate in respect to that portion of his estate.
In support of the proposition that the bequest to the defendants must fall with that to Ann Smith and Eleonora Cummings Robison, counsel for the appellant rely upon the rule laid down by Mr. Jarman in the following language: 'When a contingent particular estate is followed by other limitations, a question frequently arises whether the contingency affects such estate only, or extends to the whole series. The rule in these cases seems to be that, if the ulterior limitations be immediately consecutive on the particular estate in unbroken continuity, and no intention or purpose is expressed with reference to t at estate, in contradistinction to the others, the whole will be considered to hinge on the same contingency; and that, too, although the contingency relate personally to the object of the particular estate, and therefore appear not reasonably applied to the ulterior limitations. Thus, where an estate for life is made to depend on the contingency of the object of it being alive at the period when the preceding estates determine, limitations consecutive on that estate have been held to be contingent on the same event for want of something in the will to authorize a distinction between them.' 1 Jarm. Wills, (5th Amer. Ed. by Bigelow,) *831.
But the rule referred to is one of construction merely, and intended only as a formula for the purpose of classifying cases in which the meaning is gathered from the language of the testator expressing such intention, and is not to be applied to instances in which it appears that the contingency is restricted to the immediate estate. The same author divides those instances into two other classes: 'First. Where the words of contingency are referable to and evidently spring from an intention which the testator has expressed in regard to that estate by way of distinction from the others. Secondly. The contingency is restricted to the particular estate with which it stands associated where the ulterior limitations do not follow such contingent estate in one uninterrupted series in the nature of remainders, but assume the form of substantive independent gifts.' Id. 831, 832. Under the second of these classes is ranged the case of Boosey v. Gardener, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 122. In that case the testator bequeathed to his two sisters the interest of his long annuities for their lives, and, in case of one or both of their deaths before his, he gave the whole interest in long annuities to his brother for life; at his death, (that is, the death of the brother,) the testator gave half of the capital to his niece, A., his brother's daughter, to help to bring her up, till she attained the age of 21, then to receive half the capital; likewise, the testator bequeathed to his nephew, S., his brother's son, if not further family, his other half; in case of further family to be divided between them, not dividing the half left to A. It was held by TURNER, L. J., that the bequest to the niece and nephew was not contingent upon the death of the sisters in the testator's life-time, although the preceding estate for life to the brother was. But little aid, however, in such cases is to be derived from a resort to formal rules, or a consideration of judicial determinations in other cases apparently similar. It is a question in each case of the reasonable interpretation of the words of the particular will, with the view of ascertaining through their meaning the testator's intention.