Mr. Justice DANIEL.
I am constrained by a sense of duty to differ with the court in their determination to take cognizance of these causes.
It is my deliberate opinion that these causes, in the form in which they are presented to our consideration, fall within no one of the categories, either in the constitution or the laws of the United States, by which the jurisdiction of this court or that of the circuit courts, have been conferred or prescribed.
The first thing to be observed with reference to these cases, is the fact that they are cases in which confessedly no decision has been made, no opinion formed or expressed, nor any judicial action had by the circuit court, in which the judges by their certificate declare, that they have forborne to mature or declare any judgment upon their character, and which they have sent to this court in effect to be moulded and settled ab origine by this court.
The true inquiry as to such a proceeding is, can this be done in conformity with the letter, the spirit, or the beneficial ends and design of the constitution and laws?
In article 3, sect. 2, of the constitution, the jurisdiction of this court, both original and appellate, is defined. The former is limited to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. In all the other cases enumerated in this article, the jurisdiction of this court is appellate.
To my mind it would involve a solecism too gross for a moment's consideration, to suppose that by any distortion, the language or objects of this article of the constitution could be so interpreted as to invest this court with an appellate power over its own decisions; and yet it is not less an extravagance and a solecism to contend that this court can by any direct or indirect agency, shape the original decision of any and every case which may be pending in a circuit court, and then recall such decision into this forum for a mere reiteration of what they had already determined and done, under the mere show of an appellate or revising jurisdiction. The framers of the constitution too well understood the nature of human frailty, the influence of prepossession or vanity to believe that, by such a proceeding, either wisdom or impartiality, or the safety of private right would be promoted.
They have authorized no such proceeding, and the expositions of the constitution given in the organization of the courts by the acts of congress, conclusively show the conviction of the legislature as to the importance of restricting the several courts to that sphere within which their functions could be exercised wisely, impartially, and without the danger of bias or disturbance from foregone conclusions.
Thus, in the 'Act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,' it is provided by the 22d section of that act, that final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in a circuit court, may be re examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court.
In the construction of this section the inquiry first suggests itself, what is it which the act of congress permits to be affirmed or reversed? The answer is, a judgment or decree. What is a judgment or decree? It is an act or conclusion of the mind, founded upon a view of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject as to which that conclusion is formed; and it is to be a final judgment, showing still more clearly that all the facts and circumstances have been weighed and appreciated. Such a judgment, it is provided by the statute, may be re examined by this court. Can it be rationally contended that such a judgment as the statute describes can be affirmed of a proceeding which on its face declares that no conclusion upon any fact or circumstance, nor on any question of law connected with it, has been formed? That all that has occurred is a mere formality, and nothing more, and has been adopted expressly to avoid a judgment. How can that be said to be re examined, as to which it is admitted there has been no previous examination?
