The H-3 airstrike () was a surprise air attack by the Iranian Air Force during the Iran–Iraq War on 4 April 1981 against the airbases of the Iraqi Air Force at the H-3 Air Base in western Iraq. The Iranians destroyed at least 48 Iraqi aircraft on the ground with no losses of their own. Based on the results achieved, it is considered one of the most successful raids in the history of aerial warfare.
Operation
The target
The H-3 Air Base consists of three parts: H-3 "Main" (also known as Al-Walid, ), H-3 Northwest, and H-3 Southwest. It is located near Al Walid town close to the Baghdad–Amman highway in the Al Anbar desert in western Iraq, near the Jordanian border and 1000 km from the Iranian borders. It was erected to secure the western borders of Iraq and was also used in the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
According to Iraqi sources, during the Iran–Iraq War, it was used as a support airbase for the Iraqi Air Force and housed no more than a few transportation squadrons and a squadron of Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21s, as well as retired Hawker Hunters.
The IRIAF had received "credible" reports that Iraq – reinforced by the arrival of large amounts of ammunition and spare parts from Egypt, as well as by the delivery of Mirage F1s from France and Tupolev Tu-22 bombers from the Soviets – had been preparing for an imminent major ground and air offensive against Iran. According to Iranian intelligence, the Iraqi Air Force had relocated most of its valuable assets to its Al-Walid air base, located in the H-3 complex. Aerial photographs sent to them by Israelis revealed that the H-3 airfield had more than fifty aircraft of all types scattered across the base in the open, without any protection.
As part of Saddam Hussein's attempts to carry out a successful offensive against Iran on the northern front between 12 and 22 March 1981, Iraq fired two 9K52 Luna-M surface-to-surface rockets against the cities of Dezful and Ahvaz. Within days after this attack, commanders of the 31st and 32nd Tactical Fighter Wing in Shahrokhi Air Base (TAB 3, near Hamadan) planned a counter-attack to degrade the Iraqi Air Force's capabilities.
The attack
Being almost 1500 kilometres from the Iranian fighters at Shahrokhi Air Base, H-3 was out of range and if choosing a direct route, the Iranian aircraft would have had to fly over Baghdad and perform aerial refueling twice in Iraqi airspace, including once near Baghdad, which was heavily fortified by Iraqi air defence sites.
A team of IRIAF commanders (including Col. Ghasem Golchin, Col. Bahram Hooshyar and Col. Fereydoun Izadseta) planned a more sophisticated, surprise operation instead. Senior Iranian military officials had determined that Iraqi Air Force activity was lower in northern Iraq, so a plan was made to approach the Iraqi sites from that direction. To increase their chances, the Iranian commanders decided to fly their aircraft to Urmia Lake first and refuel in the air, and then from there they would have a "clean" route passing over the mountains of northern Iraqi–Turkish border, while keeping the altitude at less than 300 ft (100 m) to avoid Iraqi and Turkish radars. The route was around 3,500 km. Nevertheless, the Phantoms could not reach their target without aerial refuelling a number of times.
The 31st and 32nd Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW) employed eight McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantoms, four Grumman F-14A Tomcats, one Lockheed C-130H Khofaash, a Boeing 747 airborne command post (which was to monitor Iraqi radio communications, and also act as a communication relay between the raiders and the IRIAF HQ), and two tankers (a Boeing 707 and a Boeing 747) for aerial refueling for the attack.