Of course the Ashantis are really desirous of avoiding the payment of customs dues on imported goods, partly on account of the duties themselves, but principally because they consider that, being an independent people, they ought to have a port of their own. This non-payment does not seem to present any insuperable obstacles; goods thus landed duty-free would have to traverse the protectorate by a prescribed route, and a Colonial officer stationed at the point at which they would cross the frontier could examine the permits and see that everything was intact, thus smuggling would be made almost impossible. Were we to make this concession, a European resident would willingly be received in Coomassie, and the presence of such an officer would be the most effectual check upon human sacrifices that could be devised. It is difficult to see by what principle of equity we arrogate to ourselves the right of levying upon goods, intended for the use of an independent nation living beyond our borders, the same duty as is levied upon goods which are to be offered for sale in the Colony. It is just as if France should impose her tariff upon goods consigned to Switzerland, and merely passing through French territory.
By adopting such a policy I am convinced a lasting peace with Ashanti would be assured; and it certainly appears easier to found a peace upon the good-will and interest of the Ashantis themselves than to endeavour to keep them in check by forming a precarious combination of inferior native tribes, each one of which is jealous of the others, and the most powerful of whom, probably the Gamans, would, in the event of Ashanti being totally crushed, assume the position now held by that nation in West Africa, and necessitate the formation of a new combination against them. Should we, as is most probable, pursue our present policy, the end is not difficult to see. Continued friction and a species of armed neutrality cannot be kept up with a haughty and warlike race of savages with impunity; the Ashantis will continue arming themselves with improved weapons, and on the death of King Mensah, should he not first be dethroned, a monarch less peaceably disposed will ascend the throne, some pretext of quarrel will soon be found, and another Ashanti war will take place. Of course the Ashantis will be crushed, though not without much expenditure of blood and money, but what shall we do then? Shall we annex their territory or again retire? If the former, we shall find ourselves face to face with the warlike Mohammedan tribes of the inland plateau; and if the latter, the present state of affairs will continue, if not with Ashanti as the dominant power, with some other tribe that has stepped into its place.