"For two reasons, then, it is right to be content with that which happens to thee; the one because it was done for thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way."[348:16]
[306:1] By _Absolute Realism_ is meant that system of philosophy which defines the universe as the _absolute being_, implied in knowledge as its final object, but assumed to be independent of knowledge. In the _Spinozistic_ system this absolute being is conceived under the form of _substance_, or self-sufficiency; in _Platonism_ under the form of _perfection_; and in the _Aristotelian_ system under the form of a _hierarchy of substances_.
[308:2] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 185.
[309:3] When contrasted with the temporal realm of "generation and decay," this ultimate object is often called the _eternal_.
[312:5] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part I. Translation by Elwes, p. 45.
[329:8] Plato: _Symposium_, 211. Translation by Jowett.
[330:9] Plato: _Republic_, 533. Translation by Jowett.
[337:10] See Burnet: _Op. cit._, pp. 322-333.
[338:11] Leibniz: _Discourse on Metaphysics_. Translation by Montgomery, p. 15.
In so far as the monads are spiritual this doctrine tends to be subjectivistic. Cf. Chap. IX.
[340:12] Leibniz: _New Essays on the Human Understanding_. Translation by Latta, p. 363.
[344:13] Spinoza: _Op. cit._, Part IV. Translation by Elwes, p. 243.
[347:15] Plato: _Symposium_, 210-211. Translation by Jowett.
[348:16] Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: _Thoughts_. Translation by Long, p. 141.
[Sidenote: General Constructive Character of Absolute Idealism.]
§ 171. Absolute idealism is the most elaborately constructive of all the historical types of philosophy. Though it may have overlooked elementary truths, and have sought to combine irreconcilable principles, it cannot be charged with lack of sophistication or subtlety. Its great virtue is its recognition of problems--its exceeding circumspection; while its great promise is due to its comprehensiveness--its generous provision for all interests and points of view. But its very breadth and complexity render this philosophy peculiarly liable to the equivocal use of conceptions. This may be readily understood from the nature of the central doctrine of absolute idealism. According to this doctrine it is proposed to define the universe as an _absolute spirit_; or a being infinite, ultimate, eternal, and self-sufficient, like the being of Plato and Spinoza, but possessing at the same time the distinguishing properties of spirit. Such conceptions as self-consciousness, will, knowledge, and moral goodness are carried over from the realm of human endeavor and social relations to the unitary and all-inclusive reality. Now it has been objected that this procedure is either meaningless, in that it so applies the term spirit as to contradict its meaning; or prejudicial to spiritual interests, in that it neutralizes the properties of spirit through so extending their use. Thus one may contend that to affirm that the universe as a whole is spirit is meaningless, since moral goodness requires special conditions and relations that cannot be attributed to the universe as a whole; or one may contend that such doctrine is prejudicial to moral interests because by attributing spiritual perfection to the totality of being it discredits all moral loyalties and antagonisms. The difficulties that lie in the way of absolute idealism are due, then, to the complexity of its synthesis, to its complementary recognition of differences and resolution of them into unity. But this synthesis is due to the urgency of certain great problems which the first or realistic expression of the absolutist motive left undiscovered and unsolved.