The evening before our friend left us, Coleridge had a long conversation with her on serious and religious subjects. Fearing, however, that he might not have been clearly understood, he the next morning brought down the following paper, written before he had retired to rest:--
'S. T. Coleridge's confession of belief; with respect to the true grounds of Christian morality', 1817.
1. I sincerely profess the Christian faith, and regard the New Testament as containing all its articles, and I interpret the words not only in the obvious, but in the 'literal' sense, unless where common reason, and the authority of the Church of England join in commanding them to be understood FIGURATIVELY: as for instance, 'Herod is a Fox.'
2. Next to the Holy Scriptures, I revere the Liturgy, Articles, and Homilies of the Established Church, and hold the doctrines therein expressly contained.
3. I reject as erroneous, and deprecate as 'most' dangerous, the notion, that our 'feelings' are to be the ground and guide of our actions. I believe the feelings themselves to be among the things that are to be grounded and guided. The feelings are effects, not causes, a part of the 'instruments' of action, but never can without serious injury be perverted into the 'principles' of action. Under 'feelings', I include all that goes by the names of 'sentiment', sensibility, &c. &c. These, however pleasing, may be made and often are made the instruments of vice and guilt, though under proper discipline, they are fitted to be both aids and ornaments of virtue. They are to virtue what beauty is to health.
4. All men, the good as well as the bad, and the bad as well as the good, act with motives. But what is motive to one person is no motive at all to another. The pomps and vanities of the world supply 'mighty' motives to an ambitious man; but are so far from being a 'motive' to a humble Christian, that he rather wonders how they can be even a temptation to any man in his senses, who believes himself to have an immortal soul. Therefore that a title, or the power of gratifying sensual luxury, is the motive with which A. acts, and no motive at all to B.--must arise from the different state of the moral being in A. and in B.--consequently motives too, as well as 'feelings' are 'effects'; and they become causes only in a secondary or derivative sense.