The Coosaw Mining Company undoubtedly acquired by the act of 1870, and upon the conditions therein prescribed, the right, for the full term of 21 years, to dig, mine, and remove phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits in the navigable waters of South Carolina. But the right thus acquired was not made an exclusive one. The state was at liberty, so far as that act was concerned, to grant similar rights to other associations, corporations, or persons. This is not disputed.
Did the appellant, by its acceptance of the act of 1876, acquire an exclusive right with respect to that part of Coosaw river then occupied for the purposes of its business? If this question be answered in the affirmative-as, in view of the express language of the act, it must be-the state is nevertheless entitled to a decree upon the issue as to the impairment of the obligation of the alleged contract, unless it be held that that act gave an exclusive right to the Coosaw Mining Company, in perpetuity, conditioned only upon its meeting the terms prescribed by the third section, namely, that it would make true and faithful returns of the number of tons of phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits dug, mined, removed, shipped, or otherwise sent to market, and pay the royalty as provided for in the first section of that act. It cannot be denied that the third section, if it be construed literally, and without reference to other sections or to the act of 1870, will bear this interpretation. But the act of 1876, if interpreted, as it ought to be, in connection with that of 1870, will, to say the least, bear equally another construction, namely, that the right granted by the original act for the term of 21 years was made, by the act of 1876, exclusive, only during the remainder of that term, as to the part of Coosaw river occupied by the appellant's works, 'so long as and no longer than' it made the returns and paid the royalty prescribed by the latter act. Under the latter construction the right of the appellant, oy the acts of 1870 and 1876, to dig, mine, and remove phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits in the navigable waters of the state, ceased altogether after the expiration of 21 years from March 1, 1870. If the act of 1876 materially altered that of 1870 in respect to the times and manner of making returns, or the royalty to be paid, the Coosaw Mining Company received in consideration therefor what it did not previously have; that is, an exclusive right, for a limited period, in the particular part of Coosaw river which it occupied when the act of 1876 was passed.
If the act of 1876 is fairly susceptible of either of the constructions we have indicated, as we think it is, the interpretation must be adopted which is most favorable to the state. The doctrine is firmly established that only that which is granted in clear and explicit terms passes by a grant of property, franchises, or privileges in which the government or the public has an interest. Rice v. Railroad Co., 1 Black, 358, 380; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 666; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Missouri River Packet Co., 125 U.S. 271, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 874; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace-Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 49, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478; Stein v. Water-Supply Co., 141 U.S. 67, 80, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892; State v. Guano Co., 22 S.C.. 50, 83, 86. Statutory grants of that character are to be construed strictly in favor of the public, and whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication. Holyoko Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 512; The Binghamton, 3 Wall. 51, 75. This principle, it has been said, 'is a wise one, as it serves to defeat any purpose concealed by the skillful use of terms to accomplish something not apparent on the face of the act, and thus sanctions only open dealing with legislative bodies.' Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412, 438, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475.