Forced eviction in the People's Republic of China refers to the practice of involuntary land requisitions from the citizenry, typically in order to make room for development projects. In some instances, government authorities work with private developers to seize land from villagers, with compensation below the market price. In many cases, they are also offered alternative housing instead of or on top of monetary compensation. Forced evictions are particularly common in rural areas, and are a major source of unrest and public protest. By some estimates, up to 65 percent of the 180,000 annual mass conflicts in China stem from grievances over forced evictions. Some citizens who resist or protest the evictions have reportedly been subjected to harassment, beatings, or detention.
The rate of forced evictions has grown significantly since the 1990s, as city and county-level governments have increasingly come to rely on land sales as an important source of revenue. In 2011, the Financial Times reported that 40 percent of local government revenue comes from land sales. Guan Qingyou, a professor at Tsinghua University, estimated that land sales accounted for 74 percent of local government income in 2010.
Legal framework
Under Chinese property law, there is no privately held land; “urban land” is owned by the state, which grants land rights for a set number of years. Rural, or “collectively owned land,” is leased by the state for periods of 30 years, and is theoretically reserved for agricultural purposes, housing and services for farmers.
The underlying assumptions of property law are radically different in Chinese law than in most Western countries, and specifically the "Common Law" of English-speaking countries. In Common Law there is often a degree of ambiguity as to who should benefit from public investment. Governments can legally expropriate land for the public benefit.
The State may forcibly evict occupants and extinguish the rights of owners and tenants upon payment of compensation. In many Common Law jurisdictions, this includes expropriation of land for on-sale to a private individual or company. To this extent Chinese and Common Law are the same. The difference is that in Common Law there is a presumption that any increase in the value of the land due to changed conditions which give rise to the opportunity for redevelopment for a higher usage should accrue to the land-owner; while in China it is considered just that the economic benefits of public investment should accrue to the people in general.
In China, therefore, when the state invests in public infrastructure – roads, trains, water, electricity distribution, etc. – there will simultaneously be a reconsideration of land use in the areas affected. If a planning decision is taken to re-zone land for a higher use, the state will generally expropriate the land, consolidate it into parcels consistent with the proposed new usage, and then offer it on the market on a new 40–70 year lease (the term depending on the usage). This operation also allows for civic improvements including road widening and the creation of public open space.
Forced evictions are forbidden under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which China has ratified) but this does not clearly define the term “forced eviction” as distinct from the action of expropriation or resumption which is normal and common in Common Law jurisdictions.
Under China's constitution and other property laws, resumption of urban land by the state is permitted only for the purpose of supporting the “public interest,” and those being evicted are supposed to receive compensation, resettlement, and protection of living conditions. This is exactly the same as in most other legal systems in the world. Again, in China as in other countries, the “public interest” is, however, not defined. Abuses are common in the expropriation process, with many citizens complaining of receiving little or no compensation. Collectively owned rural land may be "reallocated" at the discretion of authorities. By reclassifying rural land as urban land, it can then be sold at a profit. At the same time, in many other instances very liberal compensation is paid by local governments eager to avoid delays to development projects.