Foscarini then lays down in answer six maxims, the first of which is that things attributed to God must be expounded metaphorically according to our manner of understanding and of common speech. The other maxims are more metaphysical, as that everything in the universe, whether corruptible or incorruptible, obeys a fixed law of its nature; so, for example, Fortune is _always_ fickle. In concluding his defense, he claims among other things, that the Copernician is a more admirable hypothesis than the Ptolemaic, and that it is an easy way into astronomy and philosophy. Then he adds that there may be an analogy between the seven-branched candlestick of the Old Testament and the seven planets around the sun, and possibly the arrangement of the seeds in the "Indian Figg," in the pomegranate and in grapes is all divine evidence of the solar system. With such an amusing reversion to mediæval analogy his spirited letter ends.

Some or all of these scriptural arguments appear in most of the attacks on the doctrine even before its condemnation by the Index in 1616 was widely known. Besides these objections, Aristotle's and Ptolemy's statements were endlessly repeated with implicit faith in their accuracy. Even Sir Francis Bacon (1567-1631) with all his modernity of thought, failed in this instance to recognize the value of the new idea and, despite his interest in Galileo's discoveries, harked back to the time-honored objections. At first mild in his opposition, he later became emphatically opposed to it. In the _Advancement of Learning_[301] (1604), he speaks of it as a possible explanation of the celestial phenomena according to astronomy but as contrary to natural philosophy. Some fifteen years later in the _Novum Organon_,[302] he asserts that the assumption of the earth's movement cannot be allowed; for, as he says in his _Thema Coeli_,[303] at that time he considered the opinion that the earth is stationary the truer one. Finally, in his _De Augmentis Scientiarum_[304] (1622-1623) he speaks of the old notions of the solidity of the heavens, etc., and adds, "It is the absurdity of these opinions that has driven men to the diurnal motion; which I am convinced is most false." He gives his reasons in the _Descriptio Globi Intellectualis_[305] (ch. 5-6): "In favor of the earth [as the center of the world] we have the evidence of our sight, and an inveterate opinion; and most of all this, that as dense bodies are contracted into a narrow compass, and rare bodies are widely diffused (and the area of every circle is contracted to the center) it seems to follow almost of necessity that the narrow space about the middle of the world be set down as the proper and peculiar place for dense bodies." The sun's claims to such a situation are satisfied through having two satellites of its own, Venus and Mercury. Copernicus's scheme is inconvenient; it overloads the earth with a triple motion; it creates a difficulty by separating the sun from the number of the planets with which it has much in common; and the "introduction of so much immobility into nature ... and making the moon revolve around the earth in an epicycle, and some other assumptions of his are the speculations of one who cares not what fictions he introduces into nature, provided his calculations answer." The total absence of all reference to the Scriptures is the unique and refreshing part of Bacon's thought.

The gradual acceptance of the Copernican theory of the universe — Part 50