The necessity of peace in an industrial society is everywhere recognized; and it is, therefore, not surprising that really earnest efforts have been made in behalf of arbitration. It obtained, in a measure, during the older Feudalism, through the “courts baron,” which considered tenantry and wage-questions; and it is becoming more common day by day. Within sixteen years twenty-one States and the United States have passed more or less effective measures looking to its use in labor disputes. Political coercion is also a matter that has won a large share of legislative attention; twenty-nine States and two Territories have enacted laws regarding it. There is, however, an important distinction to be made. In an ordinary conflict of political issues, when the magnates and their retainers are to be found in both parties, it is obvious confusion and the unsettling of political conditions for the employers to dictate how their workmen shall vote. But when political issues suggest a class conflict, as in 1896, some of the provisions of these laws are by common consent waived. The humble toiler may vote as he likes on the immaterial questions of ordinary campaigns; but on questions having to do with the salvation of society and the preservation of the hallowed code of “business,” instruction and even gentle pressure become the solemn duty of his social betters. There are fewer laws, it may be observed, regarding another kind of coercion. Discharges on account of membership in a labor union are forbidden in but fifteen states; and in two of these (Illinois and Missouri) such provisions have been found, after much painstaking study, to be unconstitutional. The discovery is considered a most happy one; and according to the injunction of the Federal Constitution, that “full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State,” the ruling will no doubt be found applicable in a number of the other commonwealths.
Our lawmakers are not to be blamed for decisions of unconstitutionality. Rather, they are to be congratulated. For the recent tendency of the judges to determine for themselves what shall be enacted into law has developed new refuges for the lawmakers. We have now Solon, the legislator, and Rhadamanthus, the judge, in new rôles--the rôles of the good and bad partner of Dickens’s novel. To the humble voter, when the pressure from below conflicts with the pressure from above, Solon is now able to stand as the supporter of popular measures, and to throw upon the less responsible Rhadamanthus the onus of declaring them bad law. The fury of the magnate at Solon’s demagogy is mitigated, if not extinguished, when he considers the difficulties of the lawmaker’s position, and especially by the further consideration that Rhadamanthus has the final word to say. Solon has other refuges, it is true; and sometimes these must be availed of, for it is not always certain that a projected popular measure can be declared unconstitutional. For several years it had been considered possible, for instance, that an employers’ liability act, if passed in New York, would stand the test of the courts. It became the custom, therefore, when an adequate measure on this subject was introduced, for the adverse interests to introduce a conflicting bill. The ingenious lawmaker thereupon regretfully found a divided public sentiment, and as a consequence no bill was passed. There are no reasons at hand for accounting for the fact that at the last session of the Albany legislature such a measure was actually enacted.