By his insistence upon this point, in which he joins hands with several of his predecessors, Bergson claims to have got over the Kantian difficulties of admitting the value and possibility of a metaphysic. There is nothing irrational, he insists, in his doctrine of metaphysical intuition or “intellectual sympathy”; it is rather super-rational, akin to the spirit of the poet and the artist. The various sciences can supply data and, as such, are to be respected, for they have a relative value. What Bergson is eager to do is to combat their absolute value. His metaphysic is, however, no mere “philosophy of the sciences” in the sense of being a mere summary of the results of the sciences. His intuition is more than a mere generalisation of facts; it is an “integral experience,” a penetration of reality in its flux and change, a looking upon the world _sub specie durationis_. It is a vision, but it is one which we cannot obtain without intellectual or scientific labour. We can become better acquainted with reality only by the progressive development of science _and_ philosophy. We cannot live on the dry bread of the sciences alone, an intuitional philosophy is necessary for our spiritual welfare. Science promises us well-being or pleasure, but philosophy, claims Bergson, can give us joy, by its intuitions, its super-intellectual vision, that vital contact with life itself in its fulness, which is far grander and truer than all the abstractions of science. This is the culmination of much already indicated in Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux, which Bergson presents in a manner quite unique, thus closing in our period the development of that criticism and hostility to the finality and absoluteness of the purely scientific attitude which is so marked a feature of both our second and third groups, the neo-critical thinkers and the neo-spiritualists.

Beginning with a glowing confidence in the sciences as ultimate interpretations of reality, we thus have witnessed a complete turn of the tide during the develop-* since 1851. Also, in following out the changes in the attitude adopted to Science, we have been enabled to discover in a general manner that the central and vital problem which our period presents is that of Freedom. It will be interesting to find whether in regard to this problem, too, a similar change of front will be noticeable as the period is followed to its close.

Modern French Philosophy — Part 81