To illustrate this remark, let us advert to the case of the Treaty of London, generally known as Mr. Jay’s treaty. That instrument had excited the public abhorrence. The objections to carrying it into effect were believed insuperable. This sentiment pervaded the House of Representatives, and when they demanded information from the Executive, they virtually held this language: “Sir, we detest your treaty--we feel an almost invincible repugnance to giving it our sanction--but if, by the exhibition of any information in possession of the Executive, we can be convinced that the interests of the United States have been supported to the utmost extent;--that, wretched as this instrument is, the terms are as good as were attainable; and that, bad as those terms are, it is politic under existing circumstances to accept them, we will, however reluctantly, pass the laws for carrying it into effect. The present case, if he understood any thing of the general sentiment, was, happily, of a different nature. The treaty which they were then called upon to sanction, had been hailed by the acclamations of the nation. It was not difficult to foresee, from the opinions manifested in every quarter, that it would receive the cordial approbation of a triumphant majority of that House. If such be the general opinion--if we are not barely satisfied with the terms of this treaty, but lost in astonishment at the all-important benefits which we have so cheaply acquired, to what purpose do we ask information respecting the detail of the negotiation? Has any one ventured to hint disapprobation of the conduct of the ministers who have effected this negotiation? Has any one insinuated that our interests have been betrayed? If, then, we are satisfied as to the terms of this treaty, and with the conduct of our ministers abroad, let us pass the laws necessary for carrying it into effect. To refuse--to delay, upon the plea now offered, is to jeopardize the best interests of the Union. Shall we take exception to our own title? Shall we refuse the offered possession? Shall this refusal proceed from those who so lately affirmed that we ought to pursue this very object at every national hazard? I should rather suppose the eagerness of gentlemen would be ready to outstrip the forms of law in making themselves masters of this country, than that, now, when it is offered to our grasp, they should display an unwillingness, or at least an indifference, for that which so lately was all-important to them. After the message which the President has sent us, to demand, if indeed we have acquired any new subjects, as the gentleman expresses it, which renders the exercise of our legislative functions necessary, would be nothing less than a mockery of him, of this solemn business, and of ourselves. Cautionary provisions may be introduced into the laws for securing us against every hazard, although, from the nature of our stipulations, we are exposed to none. We retain in our own hands the consideration money, even after we have possession.”