The Committee in their report, undertake to set forth the difference between treaties which contain no provision for their termination and those which do contain such provision, as follows.

“The distinction in the character of the acts, in the one class of treaties and in the other, consists in this: that in the first class, as in the treaties with France in 1798, they were annulled as to the other party, _se invito_; in the second, in the case with England, they became null with the assent of that power previously given.”

Charles Sumner; his complete works, volume 5 (of 20) — Part 70

Permit me to say that this does not seem to be a correct statement of the difference between the two classes; for in both cases the treaties were annulled contrary to the desire of the opposite party; and it is notorious that the pending proceedings to annul the treaty with Denmark are contrary to the desire of that power. No, Sir: the difference between the two cases must be found in something else, which seems to me palpable and unmistakable. It is this.

Charles Sumner; his complete works, volume 5 (of 20) — Part 70

By the Law of Nations, in the absence of any express stipulation, a treaty is of perpetual obligation on both parties,--to be abrogated only by a new treaty having the assent of both parties, or by the act of one party, alleging bad faith or hostile intent in the other, and on this account declaring before the civilized world a release from all its obligations. Such an act not only operates upon the other party _in invitum_, but it is also _offensive in character_. But if any express stipulation is introduced, authorizing the termination of the treaty on notice from either party, then it may be abrogated in conformity to the stipulation, even contrary to the desire of the opposite party, _without giving cause of offence_; and this will be found to be the sole practical distinction between the two cases. In both, the same _power_ must be invoked; but it acts in different ways.

Charles Sumner; his complete works, volume 5 (of 20) — Part 70

The question in the present case is of importance in two aspects: _first_, as it involves the determination of a question of political power under our Constitution; and, _secondly_, as it may affect the interest of private individuals.

In the first aspect, the question would not be unimportant, constitutionally, if the treaty with Denmark were the only one affected by it; but the frequency of the provision in recent treaties adds to its interest. Unknown in early days, it makes its first appearance as late as 1822 in a treaty with France, and then in 1826 in this very treaty with Denmark; but it has been repeated constantly since. Here is a list, now in my hand, of no less than _forty-six_ different treaties of the United States with _thirty-two_ different foreign powers, in which this provision will be found. Among these is the important stipulation with Great Britain, under which a squadron is kept on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave-trade; and you are now to determine whether the Senate will assume to itself the extraordinary power now claimed over all these treaties, or will leave it in the hands of Congress. And, still further, if this power is assumed by the Senate, can it be exercised by a mere majority, or will a vote of two thirds be required? How shall this question be decided? This very difficulty of detail helps point to the true conclusion. But here is the list.