The appellants are producers of oil and gas from their respective wells in the Santa Fe Springs oil field, in Los Angeles county, Cal. In September, 1929, the state, acting through its director of natural resources, brought suit in the Superior Court of the state against the appellants and others, seeking to enjoin an alleged unreasonable waste of natural gas 912, p. 1724; 1929, c. 535, p. 924. Section 8b found in sections 8b and 14b of what is called the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of California. Stat. Cal. 1915, c. 718, p. 1404; 1917, c. 759, p. 1586; 1919, c. 536, p. 1165; 1921, c. 912, p. 1724; 1929. c. 535, p. 924. Section 8b prohibits 'the unreasonable waste of natural gas,' and section 14b authorizes suit by the director of natural resources to enforce the prohibition.
The Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction after a hearing upon the pleadings, affidavits, oral testimony, and documents submitted. The court recited in its order that there appeared to be an unreasonable waste of natural gas in the Santa Fe Springs oil field, and that an injunction was necessary in order 'to preserve the subject matter of the action to abide the decree of the court at the conclusion of the trial.' The court restricted the average daily production of 'net formation gas' from 'any lease or other property unit' to the amount shown for each operator in an accompanying schedule. The court also directed each defendant to file reports showing the daily production of gas and oil, and the order was without prejudice to the right of any of the parties to move on five days' notice for modification of the injunction. The court later modified the order in particulars not important here. Appellants state that the order curtailed their production of gas from 57,120,000 to 27,187,000 cubic feet a day.
Thereupon the appellants sought a writ of prohibition from the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District of the state, restraining the Superior Court and the respondent, William Hazlett, as one of its judges, from enforcing the injunction order. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court was attacked upon the ground of the invalidity of the statute invoked. The appellants contended, in substance, that the statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it afforded no certain or definite standard as to what constituted 'waste' or 'unreasonable waste,' and unlawfully delegated power to the Superior Court to legislate upon that subject, in that, upon the facts and as applied against the appellants, the statute prohibited them 'from utilizing such amount of natural gas produced from their respective wells' as was 'reasonably necessary to produce oil therefrom in quantities not exceeding a reasonable proportion to the amount of oil produced from the same well'; and in that the statute required appellants to curtail their production of oil and gas 'for the purpose of conserving such natural gas for the benefit of the general public' without eminent domain proceedings and without just compensation, and was so arbitrary and oppressive that it was in excess of the power of the state. By reference to their pleadings in the injunction suit, the appellants also assailed, under the due process clause, the provision of the statute as to what should constitute prima facie evidence of unreasonable waste, and the appellants further insisted that the statute as enforced against them impaired the obligation of their lease contracts in violation of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution and that they were denied the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The respondents (appellees here) demurred to the petition, and the District Court of Appeal, entertaining and overruling the contentions of the appellants under the due process clause, denied the writ of prohibition. 293 P. 899. The appellants then applied for a hearing in the Supreme Court of the state, and, this having been denied, they seek in this Court a review of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal.