But I need not extend this article, you are as well persuaded of the erroneousness of these doctrines of men as I am; but it belongs to this subject, to take a general view of the ministry of Jesus and his apostles. It is so especially, because this view shows at once the necessity as well as the nature of this divine ministry. If you view the nature of truth as you have heretofore expressed it, and as I am confident you do, you cannot reasonably doubt the necessity of having it manifested to the world.
It was necessary then for God to endue one with this ministry of truth, it is reasonable that others, being taught by him should be appointed to the same ministry; but you will see at once that truth could not be preached to the Jews without moving the superstitious scribes, pharisees, and doctors of the law against it, this opposition hid its natural tendency, and terminated in the death of the divine teacher; and if the disciples had gone on and preached the same doctrine, reason would suppose that they would all have been put to death immediately, and the work of reformation would have stopped. Now, sir, if I am able to reason at all, it was necessary for God to make a display of divine power in vindicating truth, which would place it on ground too high for all the superstition of the world to remove. You contend that the voice of reason should be heard. What does it say? It says that God produced man in the first place on this earth, in a different way from that by which man is now multiplied. Reason says, there was a necessity for this; but it does not say that the means of procreation now do not answer even a better purpose than to have man multiplied by the same means by which he came first to exist. The same reason will contend that in the establishment of the gospel ministry in the world, different means were necessary from those which are successfully employed in perpetuating it.
3d. You contend that the Christian hope of a future happy existence, is not necessary to our present happiness; and that there is nothing more disagreeable in the thought of an eternal cessation of existence, than there is in the thought of reposing ourselves in quiet sleep. Notwithstanding what you say about non existence, all your play on words makes no difference about the thing talked of. Nor do I see that reason in your observations on this subject, for which you contend. You very well know that to cease to possess an identity of being and of intellect is what we mean by non-existence, and this is just the thing for which you argue. Now when we contemplate taking refreshment in sleep, it is in hope of awaking again in a better condition for enjoying ourselves and others, and for the performance of our duty. But the contemplation of passing out of existence, never to have another thought is certainly very widely different as to the nature of the subject, from the former. Now, sir, why should not these different subjects produce different sensations in the mind? And wherein one is entirely repugnant to the other, why is it not reasonable that the contemplation of them should be attended with effects in the mind as repugnant to each other as are the subjects? If it be a pleasure to a parent to contemplate, when he retires to rest with his family, the expectation of seeing them again in the morning, all refreshed and invigorated anew is it not reasonable to suppose that a contemplation exactly reverse from this would produce mental pain? I can conceive, without any violation of my reason or senses, how a fond mother can take satisfaction in nursing her babe to sleep, knowing that the tender being needs this repose; but I cannot conceive how the same affectionate mother could be equally pleased with the thought that her child would never wake again in time or in eternity. I feel grateful to the giver of every good and perfect gift, that he has given that blessed hope which is as an anchor to the soul, whereby the Christian in his dying hour is enabled to take a short farewell of his friends, expressing his hope of meeting them soon in a better world. And I think it unreasonable, even in the extreme, to suppose that a rational person could, in a similar situation, feel as well satisfied with an expectation of an extinction of being.