This is all the more regrettable because, as Ballin thought, the Kaiser was not wanting in either the capacity or the independence of mind which would have enabled him to pursue a policy better than the one in which he actually acquiesced. More than once, Ballin said, the Kaiser's judgment on a political issue was absolutely sound, but he did not wish to act contrary to the recommendations of his responsible advisers. When, for instance, it was decided that the gunboat _Panther_ should be dispatched to Agadir, a decision which was arrived at during Kiel Week of 1911, the Kaiser exclaimed, with much show of feeling, that a step of such far-reaching importance could not be taken on the spur of the moment and without consulting the nation, and he only gave his consent with great reluctance. Moreover, Ballin stated, he was by no means in sympathy with Tirpitz, and the latter was not a man after his own heart, but he was content to let him have his way, because he believed that the naval policy of Tirpitz was right, so that he was not entitled to jeopardize the interests of his country by dismissing him. The Kaiser was not moved by an ambitious desire to build up a powerful navy destined to risk all in a decisive struggle against Great Britain, and the numerous passages in his public speeches which foreign observers interpreted as implying such a desire, must be regarded as the explosive outbursts of a strong character which was sometimes directed into wrong channels by a certain sense of its own superiority, and which, in seeking to express itself, would occasionally outrun discretion. His inconsistency which made him an easy prey to the influence of his entourage, caused him to be looked upon by foreign critics as vacillating and unstable, and this impression--as was discovered when too late--discredited his country immensely in the eyes of Great Britain, who, after all, had to be reckoned with as the decisive factor in all questions relative to world policy. Such a character could be guided in the right direction only if the right influence could be brought permanently to bear on it. But who was to exercise such influence on the Kaiser? Certainly his entourage did not include anyone qualified to do so, because it was not representative of all sections of the nation; neither was any of the successive Chancellors able to undertake such a task, since none of them succeeded in solving the questions of internal policy in a manner approved by a reliable and solid majority in the Reichstag. The Kaiserin also was not free from prejudice as to the war and the causes of its outbreak. Ballin relates how, on one of the few occasions when he was privileged to see the Kaiser during the war, Her Majesty, with clenched fists, exclaimed: "Peace with England? Never!" The Imperial family considered themselves betrayed by England and the English court. Why this should be so is perhaps still more difficult to say now than Ballin could understand in those days. Arguments, however, were useless in such a case, and could produce nothing but harm. The Kaiser did not bear Ballin any malice because of the frankness with which he explained his views that day; on the contrary, members of the Kaiser's entourage have confirmed that, after Ballin had left that evening, he even tried to make the Kaiserin see his (Ballin's) point of view. Putting himself into Ballin's position, he said, he could perfectly understand how he felt about it all; but he himself could not help thinking that his English relatives had played him false, so that he was forced to continue the struggle with England tooth and nail.