On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question. He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from the standpoint of international law, and, secondly, what was expedient under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that, except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be shown that passage would be entirely innocent, the right of dominion involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it would be most prudent, he concluded, to consent. However, he added, these remarks retain little force when applied to leading troops from posts in the actual possession of England through territory under English jurisdiction, though both the posts and the territory, of right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit serious inquiry, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to prevent it, such inquiries would be premature.[368]
On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would be an offense against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there were two methods of procedure--the one was war; the other, negotiation. Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury or even hostility; but tacit acquiescence would be misinterpreted. Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A remonstrance might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369]