Mr. CLOPTON said he rose to express his approbation of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLAY.) He said that indeed the amendment could not but be acceptable to him, inasmuch as it corresponded with the ideas he had the honor to express to the committee on this subject the other day. He begged leave now to make a few remarks in addition to those which he had then stated. He said, if any thing is to be lamented as a defect in the fundamental principles of our Government, that defect perhaps consists in a departure from the plain and simple modes of immediate election by the people as to some of the branches of the Government. He did not mean however now to discuss, nor did he know that he ever should discuss, this point. The Constitution of the United States having established a different principle in respect to the election of the several departments of the Government, except that branch of the Legislature which this House composes; and the object of the proposed amendment to the constitution not being the transmutation of a fundamental principle, but merely an alteration in the mode heretofore directed of electing one branch of the Government according to the principle already established, his business and his object was to state to this committee those ideas which occurred to him on this occasion as suited to the subject as it now stands before the committee.
Mr. C. said that most seriously considering the principles of the Government in such a point of view as he had the honor to state to the committee, he was irresistibly impressed with the opinion that a legislative election of President or Vice President, whenever resorted to, should be restrained to the smallest number above a unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes. He considered it as a position clearly and unquestionably true, that if the field of election, when not decided by the voice of the people themselves, should be left too wide, more chances will there always be for the introduction of abuses in determining on a choice, if those whose province it shall be to decide, should be actuated by a spirit adverse to the public sentiment. Results ungrateful to the public feeling might indeed become sources of discontent truly to be lamented. The demon of discord might be called forth, and stalking over our land, might unfortunately produce a state of things very different from that peaceful, tranquil state, which would follow a decision more conformable to the will of the people. Such a decision he believed would be ensured were the election to be confined to those two persons only who had received the most ample testimony of the public confidence, or to those who had been stamped with equal testimonials of that confidence.