There is sometimes a tendency to forget—to lose proportion, also—in censuring seamen for not doing what the power of the sea alone can never achieve. Howe was burned in effigy in London almost at the very time when he was fighting his glorious battle of Quiberon Bay, braving the perils of rocks which were charted and known, and not, be it noted, of submarines and mines which are invisible and unknown. As the sarcastic songster wrote at the time:
When Hawke did bang Monsieur Conflans, You sent us beef and beer; Now Monsieur’s beat, We’ve naught to eat, Since you have naught to fear.
And so Nelson spoke. “I will only apply,” he said, “some very old lines wrote at the end of some former war:
“Our God and sailor we adore In times of danger—not before! The danger past, both are alike requited: God is forgotten, and the sailor slighted!”
Now, the object of this book is to show what are the services of the British Navy to England and to the Allies. Its influence has been visible throughout the world, working everywhere with unexampled success. It operates solely because of the qualities and sacrifices of its officers and men. To them a high tribute must be paid.
WHAT THE BRITISH NAVY IS AND WHAT IT FIGHTS FOR
Where shall the watchful sun, England, my England, Match the master-work you’ve done, England, my own? When shall he rejoice agen Such a breed of mighty men As come forward, one to ten, To the song on your bugles blown, England— Down the years on your bugles blown?
Antagonism between England and Germany became the central fact in the international situation many years before the war. There seemed to be a fundamental antithesis between the ideals of the two peoples. The freedom of the Englishman, guaranteed to him by sea-power, appeared effeminate and undisciplined weakness to the German; the freedom of the German, guaranteed to him only by the military strength of his autocratic State, was regarded as feudal dependence by the Englishman. Not to bring about a conflict, but to avert one—or, if the worst came to the worst, to engage in one with success—was the motive of British policy. There was no visible ground for German aggression, but deep-seated antagonism was the element of danger which successive Premiers and Foreign Ministers had had to take account of in appraising their country’s future, and, with the guidance of their colleague at the Admiralty, who based his judgment on that of his naval advisers, they had obtained the means to build up the Fleet, which was to be the country’s and Empire’s defence.