Osama bin Laden?s second-in-command has taken the helm of al-Qaida, following what many call a ?corporate succession plan? charted out by the terrorist group?s late leader. This plan illustrates bin Laden?s business sense that he picked up long before he was the face of jihad, while working for his Saudi family's multi-billion dollar construction company. His knack for business has been critical to al-Qaida's growth, but it is also proving to be a vulnerability.
Al-Qaida runs like any other business. It keeps financial records with trails of receipts, often scribbled on notebook paper. Even arguments over printer toner cartridges are tracked. The hiring process is thorough, with a questionnaire asking recruits for personal references, previous jihad experience and whether they are exiled from their home country. If a candidate is hired, al-Qaida's bylaws neatly define their top operatives' job descriptions.
These rare details of al-Qaida's inner-workings are outlined in a series of documents from the . U.S. forces uncovered the files in Iraq, Afghanistan and other battlefields over the past decade.
Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University in Washington, said bin Laden's corporate know-how defined his brand.
"I think it's his personal stamp and personal approach. And don?t forget this is what catapulted al-Qaida to prominence and certainly enabled it to become the preeminent non-state threat of our era,? said Hoffman, adding that this approach is proving troublesome for bin Laden?s group.
?So I think he applied in many cases successfully the same technique from business to running the terrorist organization, but his penchant for organization and al-Qaida?s, I think, detailed record keeping is now proving to be an enormous vulnerability.?
This vulnerability was exposed when U.S. special forces killed the world's most wanted terrorist in May. The commandos confiscated troves of information from bin Laden's Pakistani compound in the raid. The intelligence added to a collection of secrets, some of which are held at the at West Point in New York. The documents provide anecdotes about al-Qaida's training process, operations, fighter profiles and even job benefits.
As of 2001, documents showed married fighters earning nearly six times more than single men. The fighters also received on average a week of vacation each month and funded trips abroad for medical care. Files also revealed that al-Qaida requires its suicide bombers to sign a martyrdom agreement, vowing they willingly accept the mission and will not back out.
In the mix of documents is a lengthy draft of al-Qaida's central command. The emir, now Ayman al-Zawahri, sits on top with a deputy emir and a leadership council of five to eight members. Below that are various committees including military, security and foreign relations.
Noman Benotman learned the ins and outs of organizations like al-Qaida as the former leader of the al-Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
?It's a normal structure for any single jihad group. Al-Qaida's just a copycat," said Benotman. He has since denounced the extremist ideology and challenges his former ways as a senior analyst at the British policy and research group, Quilliam.
Benotman said organization is so important to a group?s survival that seminars are held on the topic for aspiring leaders of jihad. "They believe in changing regimes through violence. So in a sense, they are revolutionary groups. So that said, you have to build a very good structure," he said.
Bin Laden?s charisma helped attract recruits from around the world. But Jarret Brachman, the author of the book, , said bin Laden never intended to create the broad-based network al-Qaida has become.
?For bin Laden, al-Qaida was always meant to be an elite, exclusive club. It was the vanguard organization that would differentiate itself from the broader, Muslim world,? he said. ?I think it became, though, really the selfish creation of several individual men who wanted a cult personality and needed that external affirmation.?
But to maintain its popularity, Brachman said the core group had to ?pretend to be an inclusive, broad-based organization.?
Hoffman said before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the group could draft recruits without many restrictions. "Al-Qaida pretty much had an open hand in recruitment because few people appreciated the threat they posed,? he said.