Upon a libel filed by the United States in the District Court for Montana, praying the forfeiture of a bar, back bar, and other saloon furnishings and equipment, seized by federal prohibition agents, it was averred that, at the time and place of seizure, one Lewis had in his possession tax-unpaid intoxicating liquors for the purpose of selling or removing them in fraud of the revenue laws.

Respondent, Ryan, intervened, claiming the seized property as owner, and set up that none of it was designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, or intended for use in violation of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA), or subject to forfeiture. At the trial it appeared from the evidence that at the time and place of seizure, the place being a so-called soft-drink parlor, in fact used for the sale of intoxicating liquors as beverages, tax-unpaid liquor was possessed for sale and was being sold by Lewis. At the close of the evidence, both sides having moved for a directed verdict, the court withdrew the case from the jury and gave judgment for the government, which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the forfeiture authorized by Rev. St. § 3453, 26 U.S.C. § 1185 (26 USCA § 1185), is confined to chattels, seized in places in which raw materials are manufactured into taxable articles in fraud of the revenue. 44 F.(2d) 951. This Court granted certiorari, 283 U.S. 816, 51 S.C.t. 649, 75 L. Ed. 1432, to resolve the conflict between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Ten Bottles of Scotch Whisky, 48 F.(2d) 545.

United States v. Ryan (284 U.S. 167)/Opinion of the Court

The only questions presented here are whether the seized articles are within the definition of the statute and whether forfeiture of them under section 3453 is barred by the arrest and prosecution of Lewis, who controlled or possessed them, for his violation of the National Prohibition Law.

United States v. Ryan (284 U.S. 167)/Opinion of the Court

Section 3453 contains three clauses. The first authorizes forfeiture of taxable 'articles' found in the possession, custody, or control of any person 'for the purpose of being sold or removed by him in fraud of the internal-revenue laws.' The second authorizes forfeiture of 'raw materials found in the possession of any person intending to manufacture the same into articles of a kind subject to tax,' with intent to defraud the revenue. The third forfeits 'all tools, implements, instruments, and personal property whatsoever, in the place or building, or within any yard or inclosure where such articles or raw materials are found.' To support the respondent's contention it is necessary to read the phrase 'such articles' in the third clause as not referring to the taxable 'articles' possessed with intent to defraud the revenue described in the first, but only to the 'articles of a kind subject to tax' mentioned in the second, read to mean taxable articles which have been manufactured on the premises. That the phrase should be taken to refer to the articles mentioned in both clauses would seem to be an admissible construction, less restrictive of its natural meaning than that urged.

United States v. Ryan (284 U.S. 167)/Opinion of the Court

We are not called upon to give a strained interpretation in order to avoid a forfeiture. Statutes to prevent fraud on the revenue are construed less narrowly, even though a forfeiture results, than penal statutes and others involving forfeitures. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12, 10 S.C.t. 244, 33 L. Ed. 555; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380, 23 L. Ed. 47; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, 406, 19 L. Ed. 937; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 145, 18 L. Ed. 116; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 210, 11 L. Ed. 559.