It is not the natural faculties of the mind then, no more than those of the heart and body, that deserve the name of virtues. It is those same faculties, developed and cultivated by the will: on this condition alone do they deserve esteem and respect. The intellect is in itself of a higher order than the senses, the appetites, the passions: it is therefore incumbent upon us to give it the largest share in our personal development. "It is to that we are allied," says Pascal, "not to space and time. Let our efforts then tend to think well; this is the principle of morality." The intellect presents two particular forms: it is either _contemplative_ or _active_, _theoretical_ or _practical_. The virtue of the contemplative intellect is _knowledge_; that of the practical intellect _prudence_. Finally a third virtue might be admitted: _judgment_ or _common sense_, which is a _critical_,[113] not a practical faculty, and which partakes at the same time of both sides of the understanding.
These subtle distinctions of Aristotle have not lost their correctness and application with time. One can, in fact, employ his mind in three ways: either contemplate absolute truth by the means of science;--or judge of events and men and foresee future things without contributing toward their occurrence;--or again deliberate as to what is to be done or not to be done to bring about actions useful to one's self and to others. Hence three kinds of men: the _wise_, the _intelligent_, the _prudent_.
_Knowledge._--Taking up again, one after the other, these three qualities, we ought to ask ourselves whether knowledge is a duty for man; if he is held to develop his mind in a theoretical manner and without any practical end. But before we examine whether it is a duty, let us first find out whether it is lawful.
The scientific and speculative culture of the mind on the part of man, has often been regarded as a proud or conceited refinement.
This opinion was expressed by some writers of the seventeenth century--for instance, by Nicole, in the preface to the _Logique de Port Royal_:
"These sciences," he says, "have not only back-corners and secret recesses of very little use, but they are all useless when viewed in themselves and for themselves. Men were not born to spend their time measuring lines, examining the relations of angles, studying the divers movements of matter: their mind is too vast, their life too short, their time too precious, to occupy themselves with such small matters."