Later the Chief Secretary for Ireland, referring to a statement by Lord Hugh Cecil that the Unionists would treat the United Kingdom as one country, said that there was a new Ireland--not necessarily Home Rule or Nationalist, but "the renaissance of a nation." He had noticed, even in Sir E. Carson's speech, a feeling as of an Irishman speaking to Irishmen. The great difficulty was that the Government, in finding a solution, exposed itself to the taunt that it was yielding to force. He hoped for a national solution.
After other speeches, including one from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who summed up for the Government,--
Mr. Bonar Law (U., _Lancs., Bootle_), after again admitting the responsibility of the Opposition in countenancing resistance, confined himself to the speech of the Prime Minister. If the threatened calamity happened, the Prime Minister alone would be held responsible. At any rate, no popular mandate was given for the armed coercion of Ulster, and, if Ulster was to be coerced, the order should be given by the people themselves. The Prime Minister's proposals should have been made at once. His speech had changed the situation; he admitted that the Bill could not be imposed on Ulster without provisions for its protection, and that Ulster had a special identity justifying its separate treatment. If his proposals failed of acceptance, there was no alternative but to leave Ulster out. Ulster had claimed not to veto Home Rule for Nationalist Ireland, but to resist the right of Nationalist Ireland to govern her. If any kind of Home Rule was possible, the exclusion of Ulster was the only solution. If the Bill were sincerely meant as part of a general scheme of devolution, of which there was no evidence, let Ulster be left out till it was complete. The Nationalists had committed themselves against the exclusion of Ulster, and, so far as he could judge of Ulster and speak for the Unionists of Great Britain, such efforts as "Home Rule within Home Rule" would do the greatest harm; they would be made to be rejected, merely for the Government to improve its strategical position. Ulster was determined on resistance, on principle. Serious people no longer talked about "bluff." The Prime Minister knew that the passing of the Bill would be the signal for an outbreak of civil strife of which no man could foresee the end. Leave out Ulster, and automatically the danger of civil war ceased; or the Government might avoid it by submitting their proposals to the people. The Parliament Act, however, was used by Ministers to make themselves dictators. It was said that the Opposition were opposing Home Rule to defeat that Act, but until Parliament met the day before the Government could have submitted its proposals to the people, and if the people were behind them the Act would not have been interfered with. The Government won the last election by the cry that the will of the people must prevail; what they meant by the Parliament Act was that their will was to prevail even against the will of the people. A general election won by the Government would change the situation both for the Unionists and for Ulster, and would give the Government the moral force they lacked. Or let them take a referendum on Home Rule, and if the decision were adverse they could go on with their other measures under the Parliament Act. If the coalition did not then hang together, it would show that the legislature did not represent the opinion of even the majority of its supporters. If they went on now there would be bloodshed in Ulster, and an appeal to the people must follow, and then how would the people regard them? The game was up. They must either make proposals removing the resistance of Ulster, or submit themselves to the judgment of the people.