The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the President was not guilty of the two principal offences charged, viz: that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt, intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year 1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it was claimed that the allegation under that article was not "cognizable by the court as a high misdemeanor in office." Finally, it was claimed that proof should be made of the "actual" speech and address of the President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard to the speeches that were imputed to the President.
Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to the article in which the President was charged with the violation of the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate were secure in their places unless the Senate should assent to their removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor. The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during his term.
