About 4.30 the enemy, made a general attack in front and right flank, driving infantry and cavalry back to the line where the battery was stationed. The guns of the battery were being fired as rapidly as possible with double charges of canister, and although many of the men were recruits, having had no experience under fire, every one of them stood up to his work as bravely as the veterans.
When, however, the infantry support failed (except for the 23d Wisconsin and 19th Kentucky), orders were given to retire in order that the guns might not fall into the hands of the enemy. Three of the guns had to be left on the field as the horses had been killed. At the foot of the hill a stand was made, but the rout had become so general that the battery could not maintain its position and was almost surrounded by the enemy. Orders were therefore given to retreat.
About a mile from the battlefield was the wagon train of the cavalry division, which had become blocked in the ruts and mud and entirely obstructed the narrow road.
The road was so obstructed at this point and the rush of retreating forces so great that it became necessary to abandon the remaining three guns, together with caissons, baggage-wagons, battery wagon and forges.
To account for the position of the cavalry train we quote from the report[15] of Col. John G. Chandler, acting chief quarter-master.
"Both General Franklin and General Lee wanted the cavalry train to move in the rear of the infantry force, but they disagreed as to the precedence of position when the trains should be joined. General Lee desired that his train should precede General Franklin's infantry train, and the latter insisted that the infantry trains should move in the rear of the infantry force. Because of this disagreement no change was made on the day of the engagement."
We give here an account of the engagement as taken from the records of C. B. Maxwell and J. S. Knowlton:
"At 6 A. M. we started for the advance, marched three miles and came upon a large force of the enemy under Dick Taylor. Two brigades of the 13th Army Corps were sent to us as reinforcements and formed a line of battle, acting as skirmishers. The enemy commenced slowly falling back but closely contending every inch of ground, and in this way we drove them ten miles. At Sabine Cross Roads the enemy made a stand in the woods before which was a clearing of some 75 acres where our cavalry manoeuvred. The enemy was very strongly reinforced at this point. At the extreme front was a hill 50 yards in diameter upon which our six guns were placed. The 4th Brigade of cavalry was on our left with two of the 6th Missouri Howitzers.