“The venation of the wing is utterly ignored by the leaf markings, and its surface is treated as a _tabula rasa_ upon which anything conceivable can be drawn. In other words, we are presented here with a _bilaterally symmetrical_ figure engraved on a surface which is essentially _radially symmetrical_ in its divisions.
“I lay unusual stress upon this point because it shows that we are dealing here with one of those cases which cannot be explained by mechanical, that is, by natural means, unless natural selection actually exists and is actually competent to create new properties; for the Lamarckian principle is excluded here _ab initio_, seeing that we are dealing with a formation which is only passive in its effects: the leaf markings are effectual simply by their existence and not by any function which they perform; they are present in flight as well as at rest, during the absence of a danger, as well as during the approach of an enemy.
“Nor are we helped here by the assumption of _purely internal motive forces_, which Nägeli, Askenasy, and others have put forward as supplying a _mechanical_ force of evolution. It is impossible to regard the coincidence of an Indian butterfly with the leaf of a tree now growing in an Indian forest as fortuitous, as a _lusus naturæ_. Assuming this seemingly mechanical force, therefore, we should be led back inevitably to a teleological principle which produces adaptive characters and which must have deposited the directive principle in the very first germ of terrestrial organisms, so that after untold ages at a definite time and place the illusive leaf markings should be developed. The assumption of preëstablished harmony between the evolution of the ancestral line of the tree with its prefigurative leaf, and that of the butterfly with its imitating wing, is absolutely necessary here, as I pointed out many years ago, but as is constantly forgotten by the promulgators of the theory of internal evolutionary forces.”
Weismann concludes, therefore, that for his present purpose it suffices to show “that cases exist wherein all natural explanations except that of selection fail us,” and he then proceeds to point out that even the natural selection of Darwin and of Wallace also fail to give us a reasonable explanation of how, for example, the markings on the wings of the Kallima butterfly have come about. The main reason that he gives to show that this is the case rests on the difficulty of the assumption that the right variations should always be present in the right place. Here “is the insurmountable barrier for the explanatory power of the principle [natural selection] for who, or what, is to be our guarantee that the dark scales shall appear at the exact spots on the wing where the midrib of the leaf must grow? And that later dark scales shall appear at the exact spots to which the midrib must be prolonged? And that still later such dark scales shall appear at the places whence the lateral ribs start, and that here also a definite acute angle shall be preserved.” Thus the philosopher in his closet multiplies and magnifies the difficulties for which he is about to offer a panacea. Had the same amount of labor been spent in testing whether the life of this butterfly is so closely dependent on the exact imitation of the leaf, we might have been spared the pains of this elaborate exordium. There are at least some grounds for suspicion that the whole case of Kallima is “made up.” If this should prove true, it will be a bad day for the Darwinians, unless they fall back on Weismann’s statement that their theory is insufficient to prove a single case!