♦THE BRAGANZANS INTIMIDATED BY THE NEWS FROM PORTO.♦

These festive days were of short duration. The next post, which was expected to confirm the promises of the last, and bring news of Junot’s overthrow and capture, arrived with intelligence that all was tranquil at Lisbon, and that Porto had returned to subjection. It brought also circular letters from the French government, requiring the Portugueze to continue in obedience, and threatening severe vengeance to all who should disturb the public tranquillity. The danger was now deemed as imminent as the triumph had before seemed certain. Loison would hasten from Almeida to punish Braganza for its revolt; and Marshal Bessieres also, they thought, was about to descend upon them from Castille. The time-servers now obtained an ascendancy, and were about to draw up a formal accusation against Sepulveda, and the persons who had taken the lead in this precipitate insurrection. They proposed to him, however, that he should join with them in a representation soliciting pardon for the city, saying that all which had been done, had been submitted to by him because it was not possible at that moment to oppose the populace, and that the illuminations and other demonstrations of joy were only in honour of St. Antonio. Letters were accordingly written to this effect. Sepulveda’s object was to gain time by dissimulation, while he took measures for securing a retreat into Spain, unless affairs in Portugal should take a fortunate turn; and while he let the promoters of this submission ♦NEVES, III. 141–146.♦ send his letter with their own to the post-office, he secretly instructed the post-master not to forward it.

History of the Peninsular War Volume II (of 6) — Part 30

As the first declaration of the people at Porto had occasioned these movements in the north of Portugal, so these secondary movements, reported and exaggerated in like manner, re-acted upon the public spirit in that city. Oliveira, who had acted under fear of the French, was now in fear of his own countrymen, and soon found himself in such a situation, that he was in danger of being regarded as an enemy by both. On the day of the Corpo de Deos he wished the soldiers to carry the French eagles in the procession instead of the national banner, and this they resolutely refused to do; the end was, that only a few companies, without any colours, appeared in the train. The temper of the people was shown at this time by the groups which collected in the streets, and the agitation which every countenance expressed. Raymundo, consulting at once his own safety, and the furtherance of his country’s cause, had conveyed letters to the city, dated from Vianna and from Valença, saying that he was on his way to Spain, there to solicit succours, with which he should presently return: and the ignorant people, ready to believe any thing, were fully persuaded that he would soon appear at the head of a Spanish ♦NEVES, III. 97.♦ army. A report, with more appearance but as little reality of truth, accelerated the success of his stratagem, though it was intended to intimidate the people. The _Juiz de fora_ at Oliveira de Azemeis received orders to provide rations for a French detachment on the way from Coimbra to Porto. It was part of Junot’s policy to alarm the people by such reports, for the purpose of keeping them in submission. The means of that place were not equal to the sudden demand; the Juiz represented this to the governor of Porto, and bread was ordered from that city, in obedience to the requisition. A few Frenchmen, who had concealed themselves during the first insurrection, and re-appeared when Oliveira restored the usurped authority, imprudently assisted in loading the carts with loaves for this purpose; a crowd collected at the sight, burning with indignation; a native Portugueze artilleryman remarked, that bread enough could be found for the French, though not for the Portugueze; one of the Frenchmen returned an answer which ♦NEVES, III. 163–168.♦ provoked a blow; the mob immediately took part, seized the French, and delivered them to a guard of soldiers, who took charge of them, without knowing for what end, or inquiring by whose authority.

History of the Peninsular War Volume II (of 6) — Part 30