TAP Flight 425 was a regular flight from Brussels, Belgium, to Santa Catarina Airport (informally known as Funchal Airport or Madeira Airport; now the Cristiano Ronaldo International Airport), Portugal, with an intermediate scheduled stop in Lisbon. On November 19, 1977, the Boeing 727 operating the service overran the airport's runway before crashing onto the nearby beach and exploding, killing 131 of the 164 people on board.
Aircraft and crew
The aircraft operating flight TP-425 was a Boeing 727-282 Advanced registration CS-TBR named after the Portuguese aviation pioneer Sacadura Cabral. Its manufacturer serial number was 20972/1096 and it was delivered to TAP on 21 January 1975. It was powered by 3 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17 turbofan engines which had a maximum thrust of 16,000 pounds each. The aircraft had completed a B check on 21 September 1977, and at the time of the accident had accumulated 6,154 flying hours in 5,204 cycles.
The crew consisted of Captain João Lontrão, First officer Miguel Guimarães Leal, and Flight engineer Gualdino Pinto, as well as five flight attendants. There were 156 passengers on board.
Accident
On 19 November 1977, the aircraft operated flight TP-420 from Lisbon to Brussels, Belgium, and then TP-425 from Brussels to Funchal with a stopover in Lisbon. Flight 420 and the first leg of Flight 425 were completed without any issues reported. In Lisbon, the crew received a weather report of Funchal. According to the forecast, severe weather was expected on the route with a chance of thunderstorm cumulus and torrential rain, but was unlikely to affect the flight.
At 7:50 pm flight 425 left the gate, and took off from runway 03 of Lisbon airport at 7:55.
At the time of the accident, the then-Santa Catarina International Airport's runway was long, which made landing extremely difficult.
At 9:05 pm, on the approach to Madeira, the crew of flight 425 requested permission to descend. The controller gave permission to descend to flight level 50 (5 thousand feet or 1524 meters) at a pressure of 1013.2 mbar. At 9:05:50, the crew reported on the beginning of the descent to tier 50 towards Porto Santo, and received instructions to switch to 118.1 MHz to communicate with Funchal control. At 9:17 the crew contacted the air traffic control in Funchal and reported on the occupation of flight level 50 and the estimated achievement of the MAD radio beacon in 5 minutes. In response, the controller gave permission to descend to a height of 3,500 feet on QNH 1013 and reported that the landing would be on runway 06. The controller then transmitted the weather report: calm wind on runway 06, wind 14 knots direction 220 at nearby Rosário, temperature , visibility . The crew acknowledged the transmission. According to the actual weather forecast at 8:50, at the Funchal airport, near the tower, the wind was blowing at a speed of 06 knots (11 km/h) in the area of the runway - a heading of 200, visibility , cloudiness 7/8, rain showers, airfield pressure at runway 24: 1006 mbar, at runway 06: 1008 mbar, temperature .
At 9:23:13 the crew reported on the passage of the MAD beacon at a height of 1,700 feet and a heading of 215, while not having visual contact with the ground. Following the course of 200 and descending 980 feet, at 21:26:33 from flight TP-425 they reported that there was no visual observation of the runway and a missed approach.
After two unsuccessful attempts to land the aircraft, the crew decided to make one last try to land the plane, before they would have to make the decision to divert to the Gran Canaria Airport in the Canary Islands.
On the third landing attempt, captain Lontrão chose runway 24. At 9:43:52, at an altitude of the aircraft was reported to be flying at a rate of , and at 9:44:57 the controller asked the crew to see if they had the aircraft's landing lights on. The crew said that the landing lights were on. At 9:45:02 the crew reported on the passage of the airport's beacon and reported the runway in sight. At 9:46:48, when turning right on a 250° heading, captain Lontrão called for the landing checklist.