The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization financed by contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations.
Background
Thirty-six leaders from the financial sector, including banks, broker-dealers, asset managers, private funds, insurance companies, and academia comprise the committee's membership. The committee co-chairs are Glenn Hubbard, dean of Columbia Business School, and John L. Thornton, chairman of the Brookings Institution. The committee's director is Professor Hal S. Scott, Emeritus Nomura Professor and director of the Program on International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School. The committee's research regarding the regulation of U.S. capital markets provides policymakers with a nonpartisan, empirical foundation for public policy.
History
The committee was founded in 2006 by then-Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson.
Past recommendations
The global Financial Crisis: A Plan for Regulatory Reform
In 2009, the Committee determined four critical objectives based upon a year of observation and research into the financial crisis that are further broken down into 57 specific recommendations. These four objectives are: Reduced systemic risk through more sensible and effective regulation. Increased disclosure to protect investors and stabilize the market. A unified regulatory system where lines of accountability are clear and transparency in improved. International regulatory harmonization and cooperation.
A Blueprint for Financial Reform
In 2010, within a 37-page letter to Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, Chairman Lincoln and Ranking Member Chambliss, the CCMR evaluated all major elements in the financial reform proposals that have emerged from Senate committees, but focused especially on four as areas for compromise: Federal regulators must have the ability to use tax dollars (and recoup them later) to pay for the orderly resolution of failing institutions in cases where they judge the alternative would be national and/or international financial catastrophe. No banks or non-banks should be labeled “systemically important.” Clarity about jurisdiction over the clearing and settlement of derivatives is crucial to reducing systemic risk, as is increasing these activities. The proposed independent and transparently funded Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should be free of overriding authority except that of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (as provided in the Dodd Bill) and the Treasury Secretary (only when he or she is acting on matters of the “safety and soundness” of the financial system, as in matters of systemic risk).
A Balanced Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis Reform
Released in October 2013, the committee's position paper set forth a balanced approach to strengthening cost-benefit analysis requirements applicable to the independent agencies tasked with implementing regulatory reform in the U.S. financial system. The Committee outlined an approach it believed would maximize the economic efficiency of the U.S. regulatory system, minimize procedural burdens on regulators, and help insulate new rulemakings from judicial challenge.
The U.S. Equity Markets: A Plan for Regulatory Reform
In July 2016, the committee's “The U.S. Equity Markets: A Plan for Regulatory Reform” sought to inform the public and policymakers about the U.S. equity market structure and evaluate its performance for U.S. investors and public companies. The report set forth 24 recommendations that fell into three categories: Increasing the transparency of U.S. equity markets Strengthening the resilience of U.S. equity markets Reducing transaction costs by enhancing competition