There was little time for criticisms that evening, and the most important were those of Mr. A. Lee (U., _Hants_, _Fareham_). He was dissatisfied with the arrangements for promotion from the ranks, and with the means of defence in the absence of the Expeditionary Force. The Report of the Defence Committee, too, should have been debated before the Army Estimates. Next day Mr. Baird (U., _Warwickshire_, _Rugby_) moved a resolution regretting the serious shortage in the Military Forces of the Crown, and inviting the Government to state forthwith its concrete proposals to deal with the situation. He insisted on the youth of a large proportion of the troops, and Sir B. Pole-Carew (U., _Cornwall_, _Bodmin_) added that naval experts now held that the Navy was unable to defend the British Isles. [His attack on the First Sea Lord's disclaimer (p. 35) led to a scene.] The War Minister, in his reply, declared that the British Army was much better trained and was much more formidable as a fighting machine than any Continental Army, and the Expeditionary Force was absolutely ready to go on an expedition. Great Britain was more ready for war than ever before. Eventually the motion was negatived, and next day in Committee the Under-Secretary for War gave an encouraging account of the arrangements contemplated for raising the numbers of the Special Reserve. A reduction was moved by Mr. Worthington Evans (U., _Colchester_), to call attention to the hardships suffered by men marrying "off the strength," in which case their wives and families received no allowances. The War Secretary announced that recommendations recently made after an inquiry conducted by Mrs. Tennant would be adopted, entailing an annual addition to the Estimates of some 60,000_l._ The reduction was negatived by 249 to 212.
The question of the ability of the Navy to protect the British Isles from invasion had been raised by the Earl of Portsmouth in the Upper House on March 10. He called attention to the First Sea Lord's Statement (A.R., 1913, p. 94) that the Fleet alone was not sufficient, and to the Prime Minister's explanation that the statement had been misconstrued (p. 35). What, he asked, did the First Sea Lord now mean? Lord Wimborne replied, on behalf of the Government, that the First Sea Lord had never used the word "invasion." Before his speech he had consulted the First Lord, and both he and the Prime Minister represented the views of the Admiralty and were in harmony with those of Mr. Balfour (A.R., 1905, p. 157 _seq._). Neither arm was separately responsible for protection against invasion. The Army had to provide that no invasion could be undertaken with less than a considerable body of men; the Navy had to intercept such an enemy; these functions both arms, now as always, were competent to perform. After other speeches, the Lord Chancellor closed the debate, saying that the interpretation put on the First Sea Lord's speech had represented him as deserting the basic principles of naval strategy. What he had said fully accorded with the accepted principles of home defence.