Hence commeth it that lawes in seuerall landes do differ so much, that Phisicke in seuerall subiectes is so seuerall in cure, that Diuinitie in ceremonies admitteth change, where the circunstance is obserued, and yet the truth not tainted.
Hence it cometh that in diuersitie of states, there be diuersities of staie, whereby men gouerne, bycause circunstance commaundeth. Whervnto, he that affirmes, must still haue an eye, bycause it sheweth, what is seemely and conuenient, not in great states alone, but also in the meanest thinges of all: bycause it moderateth both what soeuer men do: and in what soeuer respect they do. In the first kinde of authours and authorities, the truth of the matter maintaines it selfe, without he said or he did: bycause it is true by nature, which staied it, not by authour which said it. And being so setled, it ministreth of it selfe no matter to debate, or at the least verie little. For in pointes of necessitie, naturally inferred, the difference of opinion is no proufe at all, that the matter is debatable, but it is a sufficient argument of an insufficient writer, if he penne his opinion, or of an vngrounded learner, if his error be in speeche, which harpeth still about some outward accident, and neuer perceth the inward substance. So that in such conclusions there is but one currant, what forceth the matter, and not what sayeth the man: what commandes the immutable truth, and not what commendes the changeable circunstance. All the controuersie is in the second kinde, where circunstance is prescription, wherin the writers credite oftimes authoriseth the thing, and the truth of the thing doth make the man an authour: wherin vnles he take verie good heede, which is the alleadger, he may do his writer exceeding great iniurie, by bringing him to the barre, and forcing that vpon him, which he neuer dreamed on, and harme himselfe to, who mistaking his ground, misplaceth his building, and hazardeth his credit.
Hence commeth it, that so many fantasticall deuises do trouble the world, while euerie man being desirous to breede somwhat worthy of commendacion either for shew of learning, or for shield of opinion, bringeth in the poore writers, and enioyneth them speach, where in deed they be mute: and if they could speake, they would aske the alledger why he did so abuse them. A generall and a verie hard case in these our dayes, when the most erronious opinions be fathered vpon the most honest writers, which meant nothing lesse, then that which is threpte vpon them. In matter of Pollicy this man wrote thus, and was verie well thought of, an other in some schoole pointes gaue his censure in this sorte, and became of account. Transport the circunstance the allowance is misliked, the alleadger laughed at: and yet the worthinesse of the writer not empayred at all, when he is rightly weyed, bycause he was forced: In this kinde of argument wherin I presently deale, it is no proufe, bycause _Plato_ praiseth it, bycause _Aristotle_ alloweth it, bycause _Cicero_ commendes it, bycause _Quintilian_ is acquainted with it, or any other else, in any argument else, that therfore it is for vs to vse. What if our countrey honour it in them, and yet for all that may not vse it her selfe, bycause circunstance is her check?