On the morning of the 24th of February two twenty-four pounders, placed in battery on the left face of bastion VIII., opened fire on batteries 13, 14, and 15 of the besieger, which they raked, and damaged greatly before they were completely finished. This time the German general proceeded from ill-humour to passion and even menaces; so that the unfortunate officer of the engineers, repairing to these batteries after a violent scene to raise traverses and rectify the line, which he asserted had not been executed conformably to his instructions, had his head broken by a splinter from a gun-carriage.
The direction of the engineering was then given to a young officer, who, after a conference with General Werther, modified the plan of the attack. During the 24th of the month there was scarcely any firing on either side, the besieger firing only at long intervals. The French garrison, which was anxious to economise its munitions, scarcely replied, but worked with ardour at perfecting its advanced works on the west.
A sortie effected during the night of the 24th, to ascertain whether the enemy was re-taking possession of batteries 1, 2, and 3, only encountered advanced posts, which retired after a feeble resistance. These three batteries were in the condition to which they had been reduced by the preceding sortie.
Captain Allaud employed the whole of the night in strengthening the batteries B, C, D. They were armed with six guns, which on the morning of the 25th swept the boyaux of communication and a whole branch of the second parallel.
The Germans scarcely replied, and seemed to be abandoning their works.
They were probably going to try another attack. The colonel was somewhat disquieted at Captain Allaud's novel strategy, which, in face of a bold assailant, presented grave perils. The calmness of the enemy made him fear some unexpected design; perhaps a strenuous attack on that salient which, if it were taken, would furnish the besiegers with an excellent position for rapidly establishing breach batteries against demi-lune No. I, and bastion II. This salient therefore must be defended at any cost, since they had been led to establish it in order to disconcert the systematic attack of the Germans. Moreover, if they lost it, they would probably lose at the same time most of the guns that armed it; and the defence had only a restricted number.