[Illustration: A BOKHĀRĀN BEAUTY AND HER TWO CHILDREN]
For administrative purposes the Khānate is divided into thirty-six provinces, each under its governor, called Beg, who is intrusted with the collection of revenue and the execution of judicial decrees. He reports as to the state of his charge weekly, and submits death sentences for the Amīr’s confirmation. Below the Beg are the Amlākdārs; who exercise similar functions in the amlāks, or districts. The state is, in theory, the owner of the soil, and the bulk of its revenue is derived from the land tax, an impost which has many features common with feudalism. Estates belong to four categories. _Milk_ lands are free of rent, because they were originally bestowed by the sovereign in fee simple on successful generals. _Milk-i-Khārāj_ are tenures which, at the period of conquest, were owned by non-Mohammedans, and remained in their possession subject to the payment of a land tax. This, in the case of irrigated soil, amounts to one-fifth, and in that of dry fields to one-tenth of the gross produce. The third description is _Dash Yak_, so styled because one-tenth of the produce is set apart for the support of a mosque; and the fourth _Vakf_, which is an endowment wholly devoted to religious uses. The Amīr’s proportion of the fruits of the soil is assessed by the Amlākdārs and their underlings, after actual inspection of each field just before the harvest is gathered in. If the cultivator objects to the Government estimate he may demand a re-measurement. The other sources of revenue are one-fortieth of the value of goods exposed for sale; and the jazya, or infidel tax, from which Russian subjects are exempt, ranging, according to the assessee’s wealth, between one and four tangas. The administration of justice is in the hands of Kāzīs--native judges appointed by the Amīr after an examination in the laws of Islām, who are assisted by Muftis, or registrars in charge of the Court’s seal. The Kāzī posted at Bokhārā has two of these subordinates, and is styled _Kalān_, or chief, though he has no power to revise his colleagues’ decisions. Legal procedure is cumbrous and ineffectual, and litigants in Bokhārā learn by sad experience what “hell it is in suing long to bide.” Public morals and the due observance of religious rites are supposed to be safeguarded by an official styled _Rā´īs_. This censor’s insignia of office are a scimetar-shaped strip of leather, with which he is legally empowered to administer “forty stripes save one” to evil-doers, without, however, raising his arm above the shoulder. He drives the faithful to public prayers like a flock of sheep, meddles in family affairs, levies blackmail, and has elevated delation to the rank of a science. With the Kāzī he serves as a spy on the executive officers, and is an object of universal dread. These social pests have been abolished by the Russians in the districts under their administration, and they have won more gratitude by this obvious measure than by any of their reforms. It has been often said that an Eastern prince’s rule is tempered by the fear of assassination. In Bokhārā the permanent army was once the skeleton at the Amīr’s banquet. In order to maintain his authority and overawe turbulent neighbours he was compelled to pay a large standing force, of which he stood in as much dread as the Cæsars did of their Pretorian Guard. In the days of independence the regulars mustered 10,000 men, armed with matchlocks, and there were about 40,000 men on an irregular footing, of whom perhaps a third carried serviceable weapons.[722] At the present time the army is little more than a plaything, for the “Great White Tsar” has garrisons at the principal strategic points, and Bokhārā under his ægis is secure from foreign aggression. The troops now number only 10,000 men, of whom 1000 are armed with Berdan rifles, presented to the Amīr some years ago by the Russians, and the rest with percussion muskets. They are drilled and clad on European models, but here the parallel ceases. Inefficient as is the Bokhāran army, the paramount power is anxious to effect a deduction in its strength, which will ultimately not exceed 3000 men. It is a significant fact that while the civil officers, from the Kushbegi down to the Amīn who measures the crops, receive no remuneration beyond what they can squeeze from the people, the Amīr’s forces are well and regularly paid. The company officers draw about £5 per mensem; the private soldiers, 6s. 6d. in our money. In the official intercourse between the Amīr and his suzerain we detect the influence of Anglo-Indian example.