The supreme court of Illinois, by its decision in this case, has but followed its prior decision upon the same question between these parties, reported in 174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198, decided in 1898. It there held that the exemption was limited to property used in immediate connection with the seminary, and did not include such property as is involved in these cases, which was not property used in immediate connection with the seminary, but was other property separate and apart therefrom, and owned or rented or held by the seminary as an investment, the income from which was nevertheless used solely for school purposes.
The rule of construction followed by the supreme court of Illinois in construing this act exempting property from taxation is so well established by this and other courts as scarcely to need the citation of authorities. One or two, however, from this court may be given. Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527, 22 L. ed. 805; New Orleans City & Lake R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U.S. 192, 195, 26 L. ed. 121, 122, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee Use of Memphis, 161 U.S. 134, 146, 40 L. ed. 645, 649, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456.
The rule is that, in claims for exemption from taxation under legislative authority, the exemption must be plainly and unmistakably granted; it cannot exist by implication only; a doubt is fatal to the claim.
The reasoning of the supreme court of Illinois (174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198), in refusing the exemption claimed, so far as relates to the property not connected with the seminary, is best stated in the language of the opinion of that court. After stating the rule of construction, as above mentioned, the court said (p. 181, N. E. p. 199):
'If, however, taking the express words of the act, and without extending their meaning by implication, they may be held to include all property belonging or appertaining to the 'seminary' mentioned in the 2d section, or to include all the property belonging or appertaining to the corporation, and there is reasonable ground for doubt which was intended by the legislature, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the state. In other words, if the language is capable of a broad or more restricted meaning, the latter must be adopted. The 2d section of the charter mentioning certain property to be located in or near the city of Chicago, and which is denominated 'the seminary,' we think the words in the 5th section, 'said seminary,' refer to that particular property, and to so hold seems to do no more than to give the language of the two sections their literal and ordinarily understood meaning. To say, as is contended by appellee, that 'said seminary' was intended to mean the corporation is to extend the meaning of those words by implication, which is not permissible.
'It is said that the only entity mentioned in the charter capable of owning property is the corporation, and therefore it could not have been intended that property belonging or appertaining to the seminary was meant by § 5. We think this position is based upon a too limited meaning of the words 'belonging or appertaining,' as here used. Of course, if the language of § 5 had been that the property, of whatever kind or description, owned by the said seminary shall be forever free from all taxation, etc., or if, as counsel seem to assume, the words 'belonging or appertaining' here necessarily meant ownership of the property, then there would be force in this argument of counsel. It is undoubtedly true that the word 'belonging' may mean ownership, and very often does. But that is not its only meaning. Wester's International Dictionary defines it: '2. That which is connected with a principal or greater thing; an appendage, an appurtenance.' He also defines the word 'pertain' as meaning 'to belong or pertain, whether by right of nature, appointment, or custom; to relate, as 'things pertaining to life." Manifestly, the purpose of § 5 was to exempt property owned by the corporation, but it does not follow that the intention was to include in that exemption all property owned by it used for purposes of the school.'
We think there is force in this reasoning, and we are disposed to concur in the result arrived at.
It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that the words 'said seminary,' contained in § 5 of the charter, referred to the corporation created by the act, and not to the school buildings and grounds, and that, therefore, the exemption necessarily exempted from taxation all the property against which the judgments below were rendered.