[8] Book i. chap. v. of _The Methods of Ethics_.
This Edition is a reprint of the Sixth, the only changes (besides correction of a few clerical errors) being an alteration of type in the passage which occurs on p. 457 in the Sixth Edition and pp. 457-459 in this Edition, together with consequent changes (1) in paging and indexing, (2) in the reference to the passage in question in the reprinted Preface to the Sixth Edition, and (3) in the insertion of the note on p. 457.
1. Ethics is a department of the Theory or Study of Practice. 1-2
2. It is the study of what ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals. 2-4
3. In deciding what they ought to do, men naturally proceed on different principles, and by different methods. 4-6
4. There are two _prima facie_ rational Ends, Excellence or Perfection and Happiness: of which the latter at least may be sought for oneself or universally. It is also commonly thought that certain Rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior consequences. The Methods corresponding to these different principles reduce themselves in the main to three, Egoism, Intuitionism, Utilitarianism. 6-11
5. These methods we are to examine separately, abstracting them from ordinary thought, where we find them in confused combination, and developing them as precisely and consistently as possible. 11-14
1. In considering the relation between Ethics and Politics, we have to distinguish between Positive Law and Ideal Law. 15-18
2. But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what ought to be done in an ideal society: it therefore does not necessarily require as a preliminary the theoretical construction of such a society. 18-22
1. By ‘Reasonable’ conduct--whether morally or prudentially reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it ‘ought’ to be done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the _means_ to ulterior ends: in particular, the term ‘ought,’ as used in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion: 23-28
2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties: 28-31