3. The notion expressed by “ought,” in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action. 31-35
4. This ‘dictate of reason’ is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives. 35-38

1. The psychological doctrine, that the object of Desire is always Pleasure, is liable to collide with the view of Ethical judgments just given: and in any case deserves careful examination. 39-42

2. If by “pleasure” is meant “agreeable feeling,” this doctrine is opposed to experience: for throughout the whole scale of our desires, from the highest to the lowest, we can distinguish impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the desire of pleasure: 42-51

3. as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds of impulse. 51-52
4. Nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration either of the ‘unconscious’ or the ‘original’ aim of human action. 52-54
1. The Kantian identification of ‘Free’ and ‘Rational’ action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom.’ 57-59
2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming: 59-65
3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important--Theology apart--for systematic Ethics generally: 65-70
4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of Justice: 71-72
5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.72-76
1. The Methods indicated in chap. i. have a _prima facie_ claim to proceed on reasonable principles: other principles seem, in so far as they can be made precise, to reduce themselves to these: 77-80
2. especially the principle of “living according to Nature.” 80-83





