§17. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such patronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino non putabant_: "Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr. occurs in 74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf. fragm. 1 of Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7, not _verbum de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. _Comprehensio_: cf. I. 41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 _ut Democritus_. _Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were _illustratio_ (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15). _Fabricemur_: cf. 87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa evidentia_: note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.

§18. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be seen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita negaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. 19. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in _negaret_. _Visum_: cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum effictumque_ are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset_: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh. Hypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime volt_: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be _in their own nature_ καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in themselves_ were incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη φαντασια professed to be able to get at _the thing in itself_, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ.

Academica — Part 129