1. In this method it is assumed that all pleasures sought and pains shunned are commensurable; and can be arranged in a certain scale of preferableness: 123-125
2. pleasure being defined as “feeling apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it.” 125-130
1. To get a clearer view of this method, let us consider objections tending to show its inherent impracticability: as, first, that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” and that a “sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning”: 131-134
2. that transient pleasures cannot satisfy; and that the predominance of self-love tends to defeat its own end: 134-138
3. that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure: 138-140
4. that any quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains is vague and uncertain, even in the case of our own past experiences: 140-144
5. that it also tends to be different at different times: especially through variations in the present state of the person performing the comparison: 144-146
6. that, in fact, the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures is an unverifiable assumption: 146-147
7. that there is a similar liability to error in appropriating the experience of others; and in inferring future pleasures from past. 147-150
1. It may seem that the judgments of Common Sense respecting the Sources of Happiness offer a refuge from the uncertainties of Empirical Hedonism: but there are several fundamental defects in this refuge; 151-153
2. and these judgments when closely examined are found to be perplexingly inconsistent. 153-158
3. Still we may derive from them a certain amount of practical guidance. 158-161
1. It has been thought possible to prove on empirical grounds that one’s greatest happiness is always attained by the performance of duty. 162-163
2. But no such complete coincidence seems to result from a consideration either of the Legal Sanctions of Duty: 163-166
4. or of the Internal Sanctions: even if we consider not merely isolated acts of duty, but a virtuous life as a whole. 170-175
1. Hedonistic Method must ultimately rest on facts of empirical observation: but it might become largely deductive, through scientific knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain: 176-180