But the doctrine can be met from the standpoint of epistemology itself. The writers who are responsible for this subjective analysis, have held that _mind_ is more nearly capable of being known by mind than is anything else, since we can interpret things only in terms of our own experiences. The real nature of a purely physical thing is far more deeply hidden from our view than is the real nature of a mental fact, even though it be in the mind of another. And especially would they grant a degree, at least, of objective currency to clearly phrased conceptual thought. Now I base myself upon the present day pragmatic philosophy,[94] which is, essentially, concerned with the problem of knowledge. Its principle is that we believe things to be true, not because of any knowledge we have of some mystical, absolute truth, but because of our experiences of utilitarian sort. That is true which works. That is true which we find will satisfy our desires and needs. In a word, desire, volition, _values_, lie at the basis of intellect.[95] Whence it follows, that if our minds are so constituted that we understand each other on the intellectual side, then there must be a still deeper and more underlying similarity on the desire, feeling, volitional side.[96] Consequently, if there be anything at all, outside of our own mind, which we _can_ understand, it must be the feelings and emotions of other men.
Considerations of a practical nature give us the strongest possible grounds for a belief that human desires, feelings, etc., are homogeneous and communicable. The fact is that we all have back of us many millions of years of evolutionary history in the same general environment. In the past, with relatively minor variations, the same influences have played upon our ancestors from the beginnings of life on our planet. And then, we are born into the same society, and it has given us, not, to be sure, the power of reaction, but certainly all of our most important stimuli.[97] Further, we do get along in society. We laugh together, we play together, we share each other's sorrows, we love and hate each other, in a way that would be wholly impossible if we did not in practice assume the correctness of our "inferences" about one another's motives and desires. And the fact that these "inferences" are in the main correct is the one thing that makes social life possible. We can, and do, understand one another's motives, desires, wants, emotions. We can, and do, constantly communicate our feelings to one another.