Some time about June or July, 1891, our tanks were finished; in about two months’ time we produced between five or six cwts. of crystals, and then stopped work on account of the rains. These crystals were mixed with an equal quantity of good crystals from the stores, and were sent to the powder factory. It must not be imagined that at this time the Khaleefa |181| was actually short of powder or ingredients for its manufacture; there were, unknown to others in the town, very large stocks indeed, which Abdullah was keeping as a reserve, but he wished to add to that reserve as much as possible, and to expend only such powder and ammunition as was then and there produced.
On the death of Perdikaki, Hassan Hosna—a Circassian, and, I believe, formerly an officer in the old army—and Abdes Semmeer, formerly in the ordnance section of the old army at Kassala, were placed in charge of the powder factory. When our mixed product was used for the manufacture of gunpowder, strange things happened. After a few cartridges made from such powder had been fired, the barrel of the rifle was found coated with a thick white fouling; then an inquiry was held. The rifles were brought to us at Khartoum, and, pointing to the cleaning rods, I asked what these were intended for; on being told for cleaning the barrel, I asked whether it was not better to have a powder which left a white ash which might be seen to a powder which left a black ash which could not be seen. But, for once, my argument was of no use. Wohatt replied that perhaps we were working on bad beds, and suggested our being transferred somewhere else. Nothing was done at the time, and we worked on for some more months; but as large quantities of saltpetre came in from Darfur, and later, considerable quantities of good powder came from Upper Egypt and by the Suakin route, Khaater was able to store away our saltpetre, and supply |182| the factory with powder and saltpetre from these sources.
The Upper Egypt and Suakin supplies were supposed to have been put to the reserve, so that when cartridges exploded in the breeches of the rifles, and destroyed the eyesight of a number of soldiers, our saltpetre came in for the blame again. Another inquiry was held, when we were told that the bullet did not leave the rifle, and that the breech-blocks blew open. This, we argued, could not be the fault of the powder, but of the rifle. Whatever the Khaleefa’s opinion might have been, he sent off Wohatt to Alti on the Blue Nile, where, with a number of Fellatis working under him, he was able to send considerable quantities of “needle” saltpetre to Omdurman, while I continued at the Khartoum works to turn out as poor a quality of saltpetre as before. Abdel Wohatt is in Cairo now, and tells me that our precious production—about two tons of saltpetre—is still lying unused in the stores at Omdurman. Khaleel Hassanein and Ali Khaater are still alive, and would doubtless smile at the legend that I “manufactured powder for the Khaleefa to shoot English soldiers with,” particularly when I forbade the use of wood ash in the saturation tanks, and this addition, they knew later, was the Fellati secret for the purification of the saltpetre.