III. Yet a statesman, in a country which appreciates his merits, ought not when at the height of his power to make way for worthless men, and place in office those who have no claim to it, as Nikias did when he laid down his own office of commander-in-chief and gave it to Kleon, a man who possessed no qualification whatever for the post except his brazen effrontery. Neither can I praise Crassus for having so rashly and hurriedly brought the war with Spartacus to a crisis, although he was actuated by an honourable ambition in fearing that Pompeius would arrive and take from him the glory of having completed the war, as Mummius took from Marcellus the glory of winning Corinth. But on the other hand the conduct of Nikias was altogether monstrous and inexcusable. He did not give up his honourable post to his enemy at a time when there was hope of success and little peril. He saw that great danger was likely to be incurred by the general in command at Pylus, and yet he was content to place himself in safety, and let the state run the risk of ruin, by entrusting an incompetent person with the sole management of affairs. Yet Themistokles, rather than allow an ignorant commander to mismanage the war against Persia, bribed him to lay down his office. So also Cato at a most dangerous crisis became a candidate for the office of tribune of the people in order to serve his country. But Nikias, reserving himself to play the general at the expense of the village of Minoa, the island of Kythera, and the miserable inhabitants of Melos,[100] when it came to fighting the Lacedæmonians eagerly stripped off his general's cloak, and entrusted to an inexperienced and reckless man like Kleon, the conduct of an enterprise involving the safety of a large Athenian fleet and army, showing himself no less neglectful of his own honour than he was of the interests of his country. After this he was forced against his will into the war with Syracuse, in which he seems to have imagined that his army would capture the city by remaining before it doing nothing, and not by vigorous attacks. No doubt it is a great testimony to the esteem in which he was held by his countrymen, that he was always opposed to war and unwilling to act as general, and was nevertheless always forced by them to undertake that office: whereas Crassus, who always wished for an independent command, never obtained one except in the servile war, and then only because all the other generals, Pompeius, Metellus, and Lucullus, were absent. Yet at that time Crassus was at the height of his power and reputation: but his friends seem to have thought him, as the comic poet has it,