The Sago Mine disaster was a coal mine explosion on January 2, 2006, at the Sago Mine in Sago, West Virginia, United States, near the Upshur County seat of Buckhannon. The blast and collapse trapped 13 miners for nearly two days; only one survived. It was the worst mining disaster in the United States since the Jim Walter Resources Mine disaster in Alabama on September 23, 2001, and the worst disaster in West Virginia since the 1968 Farmington Mine disaster. It was exceeded four years later by the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, also a coal mine explosion in West Virginia, which killed 29 miners in April 2010.

The disaster received extensive news coverage worldwide. After mining officials released incorrect information, many media outlets initially reported, erroneously, that 12 of the miners survived.

Sago Mine disaster

Background

Mine ownership

Anker West Virginia Mining was listed as the permittee for the Sago Mine. Testifying before U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) on March 23, 2006, Vice President Sam Kitts described the corporate structure as follows, "Sago is part of Wolf Run Mining Company, which is a subsidiary of Hunter Ridge Mining Company. Hunter Ridge is a subsidiary of ICG, Inc." International Coal Group, Inc. was formed in May 2004 by investor Wilbur Ross, who led a group that bought many of Horizon Natural Resources' assets in a bankruptcy auction. The company produces coal from 12 mining complexes in Northern and Central Appalachia (Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia) and from one complex in the Illinois basin.

Sago Mine disaster

Ross, originally operating as Newcoal LLC with four other investors, expressed interest in buying Horizon's nonunion properties, but not its six union operations. According to the Associated Press, Horizon was then allowed to sever its union contracts, including pension benefits, by bankruptcy court. In March 2005, ICG agreed to buy Anker Coal Group, Inc.

Sago Mine disaster

Prior inspection history

In 2005, the mine was cited by MSHA 208 times for violating regulations, up from 68 in 2004. Of those, 96 were considered S&S (significant/serious and substantial).

The Charleston Gazette said "Sago mine has a history of roof falls". MSHA found 52 violations from April to June, of which 31 were "serious and substantial" (S&S). From early July to late September, MSHA found 70 violations, 42 of which were S&S. MSHA inspections from early October to late December resulted in 46 citations and three orders, 18 of which were S&S. Violations include failure to follow the approved roof control and mine ventilation plans and problems concerning emergency escapeways and required pre-shift safety examinations. The Gazette article explained that "S&S" violations are those that MSHA believes are likely to cause an accident that would seriously injure a miner.

Originally, MSHA reported on its website that none of the violations were considered "immediate risk of injury" and that all but three violations, related to shoring up the roof, were corrected by the time of the accident. But the current posting says, "Of the 208 citations, orders and safeguards issued in 2005, several involved significant violations that were the result of high negligence and MSHA ordered that mining cease in the affected area until the unsafe condition was addressed."

"Mining operations at the Sago Mine more than doubled between 2004 and 2005, and the injury rate was significantly above the national average. This prompted MSHA to dramatically increase—by 84%—its on-site inspection and enforcement presence. As a result, MSHA also took significantly more enforcement actions—208 in total—against Sago Mine in 2005, requiring the operator to quickly correct health and safety violations in accordance with federal Mine Act standards." Davitt McAteer, Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety during the Clinton administration, told The Gazette, "The numbers don't sound good....[they are] sufficiently high that it should tip off management that there is something amiss here. For a small operation, that is a significant number of violations." McAteer said the roof fall frequency "suggests that the roof is bad and that the support system is not meeting the needs of the roof."