[Illustration: _Figure 30: Nostalgic White._ On March 5 of every year the Japanese celebrate the colorful custom of Boys' Day. Kites in the form of carp are flown over the cities and countryside and millions of families set out to give their little sons an excursion or some other treat. (It is characteristic of the Japanese that there is no Girls' Day.) This leaflet, from Psychological Warfare Branch, USAFPA, was designed for dropping on May 5. It ends with the appeal, "You must guard the strength of the new Japan, your treasure, your children." Thus it combines homesickness, patriotism, and pre-surrender indoctrination.]
=News as Intelligence.= Harmlessness is, however, a poor ideal for men at war; the propagandist who keeps out of mischief is doing only half his job. To make his message take effect he must convey to the enemy those kinds of information which tend to disrupt enemy unity, discount enemy expectation of success, lower the enemy will to resist. He cannot do so by means of recorded symphonies or tourist lectures, no matter how well done. He must turn to the first weapon of propaganda, the news.
The official propagandist is not a newspaperman. Since he speaks for an army or a government, his utterance is _officially responsible_. He must be as timely as the peacetime press, but must at the same time be as cautious as a government press agent. He is torn between two responsibilities: his responsibility to the job of propaganda, which requires him to get interesting information and get it out to the enemy quickly; and his responsibility to the official policies of his own government, which requires him to release nothing unconfirmed, nothing that could do harm, or that might embarrass or hurt the government. (A sort of institutional schizophrenia is common to all propaganda offices.)
The sources of news are various. Classified incoming operational reports of the Army and Navy contain material of high interest to the enemy. There are obvious reasons for denying access to such information to the propaganda people. Propaganda men might think of their audience first and security second. If they do not know the secret information, but are advised by military consultants who do, security will be better maintained and the propagandist will not labor under the handicap of a double standard of information--what they know, and what they dare to tell.